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INTRODUCTION: THE COMMISSION'S 
INVESTIGATION AND HEARINGS 
Under the authority granted by Governor Mario M. Cuomo's Executive Order 
establishing the Commission on Government Integrity, 1 the Commission conducted an 
investigation into certain personnel procedures and practices of the City of New York and, on 
January 9 and 11 and April 4 and 5, 1989, held public hearings concerning that investigation. 
This report contains the Commission's findings from the investigation and its recommendations 
addressing certain shortcomings disclosed by the investigation. 
The Commission's investigation and hearings, and this report, present a case 
study of the influence of political patronage on certain City personnel procedures and practices, 
primarily during 1983-86. The report focuses on the involvement of the Mayor's Office2 (and, 
in particular, the Mayor's Talent Bank) in personnel procedures and practices during that time 
period and on two large mayoral agencies, the Department of Environmental Protection 
("DEP") and the Department of Transportation ("DOT').3 
Patronage involves the hiring and firing of public employees with political 
considerations playing an important, if not necessarily dispositive, role in the decision. In its 
classic form, it involves the hiring of individuals referred or endorsed by political leaders, in 
return for their political support. In a government characterized by patronage, public sector 
jobs are viewed as benefits controlled by those in power, who may distribute them as they 
choose, and may use them to reward supporters, favor friends or punish opponents. 
Patronage is thus distinguished from the "merit system," which dictates a 
separation of politics from public personnel administration, a set of objective criteria for public 
sector jobs, and open competition for those jobs, with hiring, promotion and termination 
decisions based upon ability and performance as measured against those objective criteria. In a 
1 Paragraph I of Executive Order No. 88.1 (April 21, 1987) directs the Commission, inter alia, to investigate the management 
and affairs of any political subdivision of the State in respect to ·the adequacy of laws, regulations and procedures relating to 
maintaining ethical practices and standards in government, assuring that public servants are duly accountable for the faithful 
discharge of the public trust reposed In them, and preventing favoritism, conflicts of interest, undue influence and abuse of official 
position and to make recommendations for action to strengthen or improve such laws, regulations or procedures. 
2 The Office of the Mayor, a separate agency with its own budget and staff (see p. 8 below), is referred to throughout this 
report as the 'Mayor's Office.• 
3 A glossary of abbreviations is annexed as Attachment A. 
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·-merit system, public employees are seen as public servants, whose duty is to deliver services to 
all citizens effectively and fairly, and whose allegiance is to the general welfare instead of to a 
political group. Thus, public jobs belong to the public and should be made available and fairly 
distributed to all who meet non-political criteria. 
Abolishing patronage is, therefore, strongly relevant to the quest for ethical 
government. When political considerations affect, and are perceived to affect, hiring and other 
personnel decisions, government in~vitably suffers. Even if the number of personnel actions 
that are tainted by politics is limited, a general sense of unfairness is engendered that can erode 
public confidence in government integrity and harm the productivity, morale and sense of 
professionalism of ethical, hard-working City employees. Although the Commission has not 
made and could not make an exhaustive study of the entire New York City personnel system, 
important lessons can be learned from the parts of that system the Commission has examined. 
(See Section V, Recommendations, below.) 
Some of the City's affirmative action efforts are implicated by this investigation, 
particularly those relating to the Mayor's Talent Bank, but affirmative action is not the focus of 
this Commission. Although the Commission concludes that the Talent Bank's affirmative action 
efforts were undermined in the 1983-86 period by efforts to benefit job candidates with political 
pedigrees, this report should not be read as an evaluation of the City's affirmative action 
achievements in general. 
In the course of the investigation, Commission staff interviewed scores of 
witnesses, reviewed thousands of pages of documents from City files ·and els~where, and took 
private sworn testimony from 49 individuals, including many of the 20 witnesses who testified 
publicly. 4 Commission members and staff also consulted with experts in public administration 
· and personnel policy. 5 
Sections I-Ill contain the Commission's factual findings and Sections IV and V 
are devoted to the Commission's conclusions and recommendations for reform. After providing 
an overview of the role of the Mayor's Office in City personnel practices, Section I examines 
the creation of the Mayor's Talent Bank and its operation in the period from 1983 to 1986, 
other job-referral activities of the Mayor's Office, the early 1986 destruction of certain Talent 
Bank records, and subsequent changes in the operation of the Talent Bank. Sections IT and III 
explore the Mayor's Office's role in and effect on the personnel practices at DEP and DOT, 
4 A list of witnesses who testified at the public hearings is annexed as Attachment 8. 
5 A list of the experts consulted by the Commission is annexed as Attachment C. 
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respectively. An Appendix, titled "DeVincenzo's Retirement," contains the Commission's factual 
findings concerning certain events which followed the Commission's January, 1989 public 




SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This report describes certain patronage practices which existed in the period 
from 1983 through 1986 in the New York City personnel system. During this period, 
employees of the Mayor's Office played important roles in referring candidates for a wide 
variety of City jobs to mayoral agencies. This referral function was performed primarily by a 
unit of the Mayor's Office which came to be called the Mayor's Talent Bank. Although the 
Talent Bank was designed to broaden the pool of applicants for jobs by accepting referrals from 
a variety of sources including political figures, one of its major objectives was to promote the 
hiring of women and minorities. Throughout the 1983-86 period, Joseph De Vincenzo, a special 
assistant to the Mayor, exercised overall responsibility for the Talent Bank. During this same 
peri.od, however, DeVincenzo and members of his staff also played a key oversight role in 
monitoring and approving agency personnel actions. 
The consolidation of job referral and personnel oversight authority played a 
central role in the patronage practices described in this report. DeVincenzo's personnel 
oversight powers served as a lever to induce DEP and DOT to hire and extend favorable 
treatment to candidates referred by the Mayor's Office. And the primary concern of the Talent 
Bank during this period was to place candidates with political pedigrees, not to promote the 
hiring of women and minorities. 
As a result, the affirmative action objectives of the Talent Bank were undercut. 
Moreover, typical consequences of patronage ensued: agency effectiveness was impaired; 
employee morale was seriously eroded; and employees became vulnerable to pressures to 
engage in improper conduct and to fudge, if not break, established procedures for hiring and 
promoting personnel. 
The Commission's recommendations flow directly from the weaknesses of policy, 
management practices, and structure which this investigation has revealed. They entail a 
restructuring of the New York City personnel system to discourage patronage, including the 
transfer of day-to-day supervisory authority over personnel matters from the Mayor's Office to 
the Department of Personnel; an establishment of a separate Appointments Office to handle · 
the small number of senior, policy-level positions for which political considerations are relevant; 
strict legal requirements for providing widespread notice of employment opportunities; 
development of equitable screening procedures to assure that jobs are open to all; and a drastic 




THE ROLE OF THE MAYOR'S OFFICE 
IN NEW YORK CITY AGENCY PERSONNEL MATTERS 
A. The Mayoral Agency Work Force 
The Commission's investigation explored the role of the Mayor's Office in 
personnel matters for mayoral agencies6 throughout New York City. Of necessity, that role is 
greatest with respect to discretionary employees, that is, employees who are not hired from civil 
service lists as a result of competitive examinations.7 
Data provided by the City indicate that the number and percentage of 
discretionary employees in mayoral agencies have increased over the last decade.8 In 1978, the 
total number of employees in mayoral agencies was 101,193. Of that total, 90,486 (89.4%) were 
competitive, permanent employees, while 10,707 (10.6%) were discretionary employees. By 
1986, the number of mayoral agency employees increased to 137,257, of which 102,134 (74.4%) 
were competitive, permanent employees, and 35,123 (25.6%) were discretionary employees. By 
1988, discretionary employees comprised 30.2% ( 44,869 out of 148,420) of the mayoral agency 
work force. 
In fact, between 1978 and 1988 the number of discretionary employees increased 
fourfold while the total mayoral agency work force increased by less than 50%.9 
6 Mayoral agencies are defined as those under the direct jurisdiction of the Mayor of the City of. New York. 
7 
'Discretionary employees,' as reported by the New York City Department of Personnel, Include employees who hold 
positions which are exempt from civil service; temporary employees who are hired for specified periods of time to perform specific 
tasks; civil service employees who are provisionally hired (in the absence of a competitively ranked list); and non-competitive civil 
service employees such as those in laborer positions for which a formal examination may not be appropriate. New York Civil 
ServicE' Law§§ 41-43, 64, 65. 
8 The statistics cited throughout this section are culled from the Annual Reports of the New York City Department of Personnel 
to the New York State Department of Civil Service and compiled at Attachment D. 
9 See Attachment D. 
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-B. The Authority Of The Mayor's Office 
Over Agency Personnel Matters 
·-
The Mayor's Office, consisting of approximately 1,000 employees with an annual 
budget of approximately $70 million,10 exercises wide-ranging authority over personnel matters 
in mayoral agencies. The Department of Personnel ("DOP"), a separate mayoral agency with 
over 500 employees and a $30 million annual budget, also has responsibilities for agency 
personnel matters, some of which it exercises in conjunction with the Mayor's Office.11 
1. PAR And MPD Authority 
Joseph De Vincenzo, a special assistant to the Mayor, exercised key aspects of 
the authority of the Mayor's Office over agency personnel actions throughout the period from 
1983 to 1986, indeed until his resignation in February 1989. DeVincenzo and his staff exercised 
this authority principally through the review and approval process for Planned Action Reports 
("P ARs") and Managerial Position Descriptions ("MPDs"). 
P ARs are forms submitted by mayoral agencies on a monthly basis to the 
Mayor's Office for the purpose (insofar as is relevant to personnel matters) of obtaining 
approval to hire, promote, give a raise to, change the title of, transfer or demote a City 
employee.12 Thus, in essence, mayoral agencies submitted PARs in connection with all 
significant personnel actions relating to their employees. As James Hein, DeVincenzo's 
principal aide for PAR matters, testified: "Just about anything that can happen to a City 
employee has to come through my desk."13 
Although P ARs were also submitted to DOP and the Office of Management and 
Budget ("OMB"), DeVincenzo's office was the decisive force in the PAR approval process.14 
1 O Jan. Tr. at 455-56. References in this format are to pages of the transcript of the Commission's January 9 and 11, 1989 
public hearings. 
11 Other entities with authority over agency personnel matters include the Office of Management and Budget ('OMB') and 
the Office of Municipal Labor Relations ('OMLR') . 
12 DeVincenzo at 44-45, 50; Hein at 11-12. References in this format, i.e., with the name of a witness and page number, 
are to pages of that witness' private hearing transcript. At the request of the New York County District Attorney, the Commission 
is not making public any witness' private hearing transcript at this time. 
13 Hein at 3. 
14 Hein at 52-53; DeVincenzo at 51 . 
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As De Vincenzo testified, DO P's and OMB's review of P ARs was "based on a technical aspect 
of the process."15 Indeed, when asked what DOP's role was in the process, Hein testified that 
it had no real role.16 Moreover, the Mayor's Office was the final sign-off authority on PARs,17 
communicating the outcome of the review process in the form of a letter commonly known 
throughout City personnel circles as the "Joe D. letter." 
The receipt of a Joe D. letter was crucial to a range of personnel actions subject 
to "pre-audit" review. These actions --- which included all actions affecting managerial 
employees (such as hires, promotions or raises) and certain other actions affecting non-
managerial employees (such as hires, promotions or transfers after which the employee would 
be paid a salary in excess of that prescribed by various guidelines) --- could not be effectuated 
by agencies until after PARs were submitted and the requisite Joe D. letter obtained.18 Most 
personnel actions, however, were subject to "post-audit" or after-the-fact review.19 In other 
words, all personnel actions that did not fall withjn the class of actions subject to "pre-audit" 
review could be implemented by agencies without first obtaining a Joe D. letter. Agencies, 
however, were still required to submit PARs relating to these actions to DeVincenzo's office for 
after-the-fact review and approval.20 
Each PAR, be it "pre-audit" or "post-audit", had to provide a written justification 
for the particular personnel action it described, and DeVincenzo's office reviewed the 
sufficiency of the justification.21 An important function of the PAR review process was to set 
15 DeVincenzo at 47. 
16 Hein at 53. 
17 DeVincenzo at 71, 73. 
18 Hein at 20, 42-46. 
19 DeVincenzo at 34. 
20 This 'pre-audif and 'post-audit" system was instituted in 1980 pursuant to Mayoral Directive 80-1, which DeVincenzo helped 
write. (DeVincenzo at 75.) This directive established a general policy of post-audit review of mayoral agency personnel actions 
provided that agencies operated within their budgetary guidelines set by OMB and acted in accordance with civil service law. 
Directive 80-1, however, stated that the application of the post-audit policy was a 'privilege' that could be withdrawn at any time. 
Directive 80-1 specified the various kinds of personnel actions subject to 'pre-audif and 'post-audif review. The kinds of 
actions subject to pre-audit review expanded in the years following the issuance of 80-1 . (De Vincenzo at 161-62.) Most notably, 
the hiring of labor class employees became subject to 'pre-audif review in 1986. DeVincenzo at 110-13. 




the salary of mayoral agency employees.22 
DeVincenzo exercised additional authority in the MPD review process. When 
agencies sought to create a new managerial position or upgrade an existing managerial position, 
they were required to submit MPDs to DeVincenzo's office and to DOP.23 These forms 
describe the prospective responsibilities of the new or upgraded position and request that a 
particular "M" level be assigned to the position.24 The City's managerial classification system 
consists of ten managerial, or "M" levels, with Ml the lowest and MlO the highest level. Since 
MPDs relate to managerial employees, they are subject to "pre-audit" review.25 Accordingly, 
agencies cannot hire a new manager or promote an incumbent manager until the need for a 
new manager and the particular "M" level to be assigned is reviewed and approved. 
Until 1987, DeVincenzo's office and DOP exercised joint authority over all 
MPDs.26 When beVincenzo's office completed its review,27 it communicated its position to 
DOP and DOP in tum communicated the outcome of the review process (i.e., approval or 
rejection of the prospective managerial position or approval of the position at a lower "M" 
level) to the agencies.28 Although DOP and DeVincenzo's office jointly determined whether to 
approve the creation or upgrading of a managerial position and the particular "M" level to be 
assigned to the new or upgraded position, it was DeVincenzo's office which reviewed and 
approved --- through the PAR process --- agency decisions concerning the candidate chosen and 
the salary to be paid.29 Since these decisions were subject to pre-audit review, they could not 
22 Hein at 27. Generally, agencies could pay an employee in a particular job title a salary within a specified range. If, for 
example, an agency sought to hire a new employee and pay a salary above the minimum amount specified for the position, 
DeVincenzo's staff reviewed the justification proffered by the agency and, on the basis of such factors as the prior salary history 
of the candidate, the salary paid to comparable employees or the salary paid to subordinates, would determine either to approve 
the salary at the amount requested or at a lower amount within the applicable range. Hein at 24, 28-31. 
23 DeVincenzo at 35; Skolnick at 42. (Barry Skolnick, a Mayor's Office employee, worked on MPDs during the relevant time 
period.) 
24 DeVincenzo at 26, 129;. Hein at 14, 17. 
25 DeVincenzo at 34, 99-100; Hein at 20, 42-43. 
26 In 1987, First Deputy Mayor Brezenoff altered the authority of the Mayor's Office and DOP over MPDs: DOP became the 
lead office in MPD review and review of MPDs by DeVincenzo's office, particularly those relating to managerial positions at levels 
M1 through M4, was curtailed. Brezenoff at 221-23; DeVincenzo at 27-29, 36-37; Skolnick at 17-20, 27-28, 44. 
27 DeVincenzo's staff evaluated MPDs against criteria such as the type and nature of the supervisory duties of the position, 
whether the putative manager's subordinates would be clericals or professionals, the extent to which the position entailed budgetary 
responsibilities and the level of expertise called for by the position. Skolnick at 22-23. 
28 Skolnick at 23, 32. 
29 Skolnick at 34; Hein at 24, 28-31 . 
-10-
be implemented without a Joe D. letter. 30 
2. Vacancy Notification Procedures 
A mayoral directive issued on April 18, 1983 established new hiring procedures 
for positions at mayoral agencies, other than those governed by a current civil service list. 
Under these procedures, as supplemented by subsequent directives, agencies were required to 
submit written notice of job vacancies to the Mayor's Office. The Mayor's Office was to be 
accorded at least ten working days following receipt of the notice in which to submit the names 
of candidates for the vacant positions. The final decision concerning the selection of a 
candidate was to remain with the agency, but mayoral agencies were prohibited by the directive 
from selecting candidates without considering candidates supplied by the Mayor's Office. In the 
event an agency determined not to hire a Mayor's Office candidate, it 'Yas obliged to explain 
why.31 
The promulgation of this April 1983 directive added to DeVincenzo's personnel 
authority. His office received the vacancy notices called for by the directive and referred 
candidates in response to the notices. Through the PAR review process, moreover, 
DeVincenzo's office enforced compliance with the directive's requirement that candidates 
referred in response to the vacancy notices be considered and adequate explanations be given if 
Mayor's Office candidates were not selected. 
C. The Creation And Operation Of The Talent Bank: 1983-86 
By promulgating the procedures requiring notice to the Mayor's Office of job 
vacancies, the Mayor's April 18, 1983 directive, in effect, created the Mayor's Talent Bank.32 
As Mayor Koch has stated, in both his private and public appearances before the Commission, 
30 DeVincenzo at 99-100; Hein at 42-43. 
31 Koch at 94; April Tr. at 561 ; April Exhibit 1. {References in this format are to pages of the transcript of the Commission's 
April 4 and 5, 1989 public hearings and exhibits introduced at those hearings.) An earlier directive, Mayoral Directive 78-11 , 
issued in 1978 established posting requirements for job vacancies. The directive required that public notices be prominently 
posted by all City agencies, placed on file at DOP and published in the City Record. The purpose of this directive was to broaden 
the pool of applicants and thus increase competition for City jobs. Koch at 103. 
32 The term 'Mayor's Talent Bank,' was coined later. A press release issued by the Mayor on June 28, 1983 referred rather 
to the 'minority recruitment program announced April 18.' The unit of DeVincenzo's staff that implemented the new notification 
procedures and referred candidates from the Mayor's Office later became known as the 'Talent Bank.' 
-· 
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a "major component" of the Talent Bank was affirmative action.33 Increasing the number of 
minorities and women in the City's work force, however, was not the Talent Bank's sole 
objective. In his private appearance before the Commission, Mayor Koch stated that he 
established the Talent Bank for affirmative action purposes and 
also [to] accommodate the political need when people would say, 
"Now listen, we are supporting the administration. We worked for 
you. We are not asking that you give us a job, but give us an 
opportunity to submit people so that you can consider them .... "34 
Similarly, the Mayor's April 18, 1983 directive alludes to two purposes underlying the new 
procedures it mandated: (1) "guarantee[ing] that the City is maximizing its efforts to attract 
wom{;n and members of minority groups to city service" and (2) ensuring that agencies would 
"have the widest selection of candidates from which to choose including qualified women, 
members of minority groups, and individuals recommended by civic and political organizations."35 
The Talent Bank, accordingly, was also designed to meet a perceived political 
need by providing a mechanism through which individuals referred by political figures36 would 
be considered for City jobs. As is discussed below, this objective of the Talent Bank seriously 
undercut its affirmative action goals.37 
1. De Vincenzo's View Of The Talent Bank's Purposes 
In November 1985, DeVincenzo appointed Nydia Padilla-Barham ("Padilla") as 
the director of the Talent Bank.38 In the course of familiarizing herself with the Talent Bank's 
operations, Padilla reviewed computer printouts relating to the candidates previously placed in 
33 Koch at 65-66; April Tr. at 560-61. 
34 Koch at 66. 
35 April Exhibit 1. The Mayor referred to both of the Talent Bank's objectives when he announced its creation. April Tr. at 
605-06. 
36 The term 'political figure' as used in this report includes both elected public officials, such as borough presidents, and 
leaders of political parties, such as district or county leaders. 
37 On July 14, 1989, Mayor Koch made public two reports containing historical descriptions of the Talent Bank which are 
at odds with or ignore certain of the evidence considered and factual findings made by the Commission in this report, particularly 
the evidence and findings concerning the preferences accorded candidates referred by political figures. 
38 Jan. Tr. at 61 . 
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jobs and those currently pending.39 She concluded that the number of candidates successfully 
referred by the Talent Bank was low and, given her understanding that the primary purpose of 
the Talent Bank was to promote the hiring of minorities and women, that the pending 
candidates included relatively few minorities. 40 At the time, the Talent Bank's recruitment 
efforts were negligible and no member of its staff was engaged in any recruitment activities.41 
Its four full-time staff members consisted of Luz Morales, the "coordinator" who supervised the 
daily activities of the other staff; Denita Williams, who was responsible for entering data into 
and retrieving it from the Talent Bank's computer; and Magaly Maldonado and Annette 
Luyanda-Medina ("Luyanda"), who performed clerical duties.42 Accordingly, Padilla's first 
proposal to DeVincenzo was that the Talent Bank hire a full-time recruiter to publicize the 
Talent Bank, open up the Talent Bank to the general public and increase recruitment of 
minorities and women. 43 
Padilla testified that DeVincenzo's response was a "sharp, no."44 Although 
"street resumes" (unsolicited resumes submitted by the general public), were "okay," he 
explained to Padilla that "the real purpose [of the Talent Bank] is ... these political resumes 
that are submitted to us .... "45 Her "main goal," according to DeVincenzo, was to track and 
follow-up on resumes referred by political figures to make sure that they were being referred 
for vacancies. 46 Padilla was further instructed to keep Hein informed when resumes referred by 
political figures were forwarded to agencies so that Hein could follow-up on them with the 
agencies.47 And, as DeVincenzo told her at this or a later meeting, she should keep him 
39 Jan. Tr. at 66-67; Padilla Feb. at 21. References in this format are to pages of Padilla's February 24, 1988 private hearing 
transcript. References to 'Padilla Sept. at_. are to Padilla's September 13, 1988 private hearing transcript. 
40 Jan. Tr. at 66-67; Padilla Feb. at 17; Padilla Sept. at 16. 
41 Jan. Tr. at 67-08; Padilla Sept. at 17-18. 
42 Jan. Tr. at 62; Padilla Sept. at 13-14. 
43 Jan. Tr. at 67-08; Padilla Feb. at 18. 
44 Jan. Tr. at 68; Padilla Sept. at 18. 
45 Jan. Tr. at 69; Padilla Feb. at 22-23, 92-94; Padilla Sept. at 18-19. 
46 Jan. Tr. at 69-70; Padilla Feb. at 22·23. 




apprised of the status of these referrals so that he could answer the questions he received from 
the political figures who referred the candidates.48 
2. The Talent Bank Computer, The Black Book, 
Resume Cover Sheets And Colored Folders 
The record-keeping practices of the Talent Bank afford additional proof that 
advancing the hiring of politically referred candidates was DeVincenzo's chief concern. 
Through its computer, the Talent Bank was able systematically to keep track of and monitor 
the progress of politically referred resumes. In February 1985, the Talent Bank had acquired its 
own office space on the first floor of 52 Chambers Street, across from City Hall.49 As of then, 
if not earlier, the Talent Bank computer was able to "look up" the pending candidates and the 
hired candidates submitted by a particular referral source and, upon command, print a listing of 
that source's pending or hired candidates.50 
These "source" printouts were regularly used to apprise DeVincenzo of the status 
of candidates submitted by political figures. During the brief period (a matter of a few months) 
after Padilla became the director of the Talent Bank and before the purging of referral source 
information from its files and computer (see Section l.D. below), Padilla met with DeVincenzo 
on at least a bi-weekly basis.51 Consistent with DeVincenzo's instructions that she should track 
the politically referred resumes and keep him apprised of their status, Padilla reported on 
recent Talent Bank placements.52 DeVincenzo "always wanted to know the source" of 
placements53 and Padilla provided him with printouts, including printouts containing information 
concerning the referral source of Talent Bank candidates.54 
48 Padilla Sept. at 18-19. The accuracy of this account is corroborated by the fact that, among other things, the Talent 
Bank had been operating for more than two years without a recruiter on its staff. The Talent Bank did receive referrals from the 
Mayor's Minority Affairs and Hispanic Affairs Advisors and politically referred candidates were not exclusively white males. And 
efforts were made to obtain female candidates from a women's organization. However, the Talent Bank did not have any recruiting 
staff until the Spring of 1986. Padilla Feb. at 10-11, 88. 
49 Previously, the members of DeVincenzo's staff who performed Talent Bank duties were located in City Hall in Room 1 • 
- the basement office area which included DeVincenzo's office - and in an adjoining room, Room 3-A. 
50 Jan. Tr. at 73-74; April Tr. at 134-35. 
51 Jan. Tr. at 80-81; Padilla Sept. at 29-30; Padilla Feb. at 30. 
52 
.!Q. 
53 Padilla Feb. at 30. 
54 Jan. Tr. at 80, 82-83; Padilla Sept. at 29-30; Padilla Feb. at 30. 
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Before Padilla became the director of the Talent Bank, Hein (who was then 
responsible for the Talent Bank as well as his PAR duties) requested and obtained Talent Bank 
computer printouts. In addition to requests for printouts concerning the status of individual 
candidates, Hein frequently requested printouts of all pending and hired candidates referred by 
particular political figures.55 Hein requested the printouts from Morales who would direct the 
Talent Bank's computer operator (Williams or her predecessor) to generate them.56 
The Talent Bank's computer contained referral source information well before 
the Talent Bank moved from City Hall to 52 Chambers Street. Vickie Moffitt, a Mayor's 
Office employee who had various responsibilities while working under DeVincenzo from 
January 1979 to February 1985, was asked by DeVincenzo in late 1983 or early 1984 to 
computerize the Talent Bank.57 At DeVincenzo's direction, referral source information was 
entered into the Talent Bank's then relatively unsophisticated computer.58 As Moffitt stated in 
private sworn testimony: 
[DeVincenzo] wanted to be able to pull out [of the computer] 
how many candidates were placed in jobs, how many candidates 
didn't get jobs, what the jobs were, all of blank's candidates, all 
of, say, John LoCicero's candidates, which of them got jobs, which 
of them didn't. 
* * * 
The referral source was important. You know, it had to be in 
there, it was always part of it. That was always important...be-
cause one of the reports Joe wanted was to be able to see by 
referral source who got a job and who didn't, how many jobs 
people had gotten by referral source .... He said that's what he 
wanted to know. 59 
Moffitt, accordingly, designed forms containing various information relating to 
each Talent Bank candidate and the forms had a space in which the referral source of the 
55 Jan. Tr. at 163-64, 179; Maldonado at 81-90; Luyanda at 26, 35-36. 
56 Jan. Tr. at 163-64, 179; Maldonado at 81-90; Luyanda at 26, 35-36. 
57 Moffitt at 2, 10, 23. 
58 Moffitt at 10-11. 
59 Moffitt at 11, 36-37. 
.. 
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candidate was entered.60 The information in the forms was then entered into the computer.61 
The computer equipment then in use could only keep track of such information as the job 
qualifications and referral source of candidates; it could not "match" candidates with job 
vacancies. 62 
Because DeVincenzo wanted the Talent Bank's computer to match candidates 
with job vacancies, Moffitt obtained the assistance of the New York City Financial Information 
Services Agency ("FISA") in the Spring of 1984.63 FISA employees worked on a program for a 
FISA mainframe computer that would permit matching.64 Helen Mosley, a FISA employee who 
became a Mayor's Office employee in October 1984, worked on this program and subsequently 
developed a program for the personal computer system that the Talent Bank was using by 
February 1985.65 
According to Mosley, whose testimony on this subject is in accord with Moffitt's, 
including referral source information in the computer system "was just always part of it from the 
beginning, just always part of it."66 Referral source information was needed because 
DeVincenzo "always wanted to know what happened when people were referred by other 
people."67 
Also for this reason, Mosley created the "Black Book," a large, three-ring binder 
--- with the words "Talent Bank" printed prominently on its spine --- containing computer-
generated listings of pending and hired Talent Bank candidates in its various subdivisions. 
Thus, the "Black Book" provided a ready means of identifying, for example, either the pending 
or hired candidates referred by a particular source or the source of a pending or hired can-
didate. 
60 !.Q.. at 10, 12. 
61 !.Q.. at 10. 
62 !.Q.. at 13-14, 19. 
63 !.Q.. at 19-20. 
64 !.Q.. at 19-21 . 
65 April Tr. at 335; Moffitt at 23; Mosley at 4, 135, 140. 
66 Mosley at 16. 
67 Id. at 20. 
-16-
Mosley created the "Black Book" in response to complaints from DeVincenzo's 
staff members about the timeliness of reports on Talent Bank candidates68 and in order to put 
comprehensive information at the fingertips of DeVincenzo's staff and thus obviate the need to 
generate printouts in response to specific requests for information about Talent Bank candi-
dates. 69 Mosley updated the "Black Book" at least once; for reasons that are not clear, she 
apparently updated it for the last time in the Summer of 1985.70 
The Commission_ also obtained significant documents reflecting Talent Bank 
record-keeping practices from Joy Schwartz, an aide to DeVincenzo who was in charge of the 
Talent Bank --- reporting directly to De Vincenzo --- for about a one-year period beginning in 
early 1984 and ending in early 1985.71 Among the documents obtained from Schwartz are some 
350 "resume cover sheets." These resume cover sheets, the existence of which the Commission 
first learned from Padilla, Maldonado and Luyanda, are forms which record for each candidate 
the relevant data put into the Talent Bank computer.72 At the top of each form, immediately 
adjacent to a space for the name of the candidate, is a space (designated "Source") for his or 
her referral source. The source space was completed, in the handwriting of many different 
aides to DeVincenzo, on virtually all of the resume cover sheets obtained from Schwartz. 
Other documents obtained from Schwartz corroborate the testimony of several 
witnesses that letters from political figures and other materials disclosing the referral source of 
candidates were included in the Talent Bank's files.73 Schwartz' own files contained in excess 
of thirty letters addressed to De Vincenzo or members of his staff from political figures referring 
job candidates. Letters and other documents revealing the referral sources of candidates were 
68 Mosley also testified that DeVincenzo made such complaints but was unsure 'whether he complained directly to me or 
someone told me he was complaining.' April Tr. at 338-39. 
69 April Tr. at 338-39; Mosley at 103-06, 179-80, 182. 
70 April Tr. at 340; Mosley at 106, 107, 184-85. Although DeVincenzo denied any knowledge of the 'Black Book,' one 
member of his staff - a clerical employee - acknowledged her familiari1y with it and testified that she saw it in DeVincenzo's office 
on one occasion. (Barlow at 29, 32, 37-39.) Mosley testified that when she first created and updated the Black Book she placed 
it on a shelf above the desk of DeVincenzo's secretary. April Tr. at 340; Mosley at 106, 183-85. 
Padilla provided the 'Black Book' to the Commission. She, in turn, received it from DeVincenzo. During the course of 
a meeting in December, 1985 or January, 1986, DeVincenzo mentioned a book that had been prepared for him and asked that 
it be brought to the meeting. He then gave that book (the 'Black Book') to Padilla telling her that she could use its format or 
develop a different means of keeping him posted about the Talent Bank's candidates. Jan. Tr. at 83. 
71 April Tr. at 106-07, 109. 
72 Sample copies of resume cover sheets are reproduced as Attachment E. 
73 Jan. Tr. at 113, 151-52; Maldonado at 41-43, 75, 97-98; Luyanda at 7, 20; Padilla Feb. at 20, 47. 
-. 
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routed from DeVincenzo to the Talent Bank.74 Indeed, these~letters and documents were 
apparently the primary means by which the source of a resume could be identified for purposes 
of completing the "source" space on resume cover sheets. 
At least for a brief period of time prior to the purging of referral source 
documents from the Talent Bank's files, the individual candidate folders were color-coded.75 
The resumes and other materials relating to politically referred candidates --- or the most 
important, or "hottest," of these sources --- were stored in red folders while the resumes of 
unreferred, "street" candidates were stored in green folders.76 
3. The Preferential Treatment Accorded To Politically 
Referred Candidates By The Talent Bank 
Following the Talent Bank's move in February 1985 to 52 Chambers Street, 
politically referred resumes received special treatment at every phase of the Talent Bank's 
processes. When resumes were received at the Talent Bank,n application forms were mailed to 
the candidates. Politically referred resumes were separated from "street" resumes and 
application forms were mailed first to the politically referred candidates.78 When applications 
were returned, the resumes and accompanying materials were sent in batches of ten to Harry 
Shapiro for classification.79 Here, too, candidates whose resumes were referred by political 
figures often went to the head of the line. Batches of politically referred resumes were 
74 April Tr. at 136-37. When the Talent Bank obtained its own office space at 52 Chambers Street in February 1985, these 
letters and documents were routed (along with accompanying resumes) to the Talent Bank and then to the office of Harry Shapiro. 
Shapiro evaluated Talent Bank resumes to determine the particular job titles for which candidates qualified. The various papers 
relating to candidates were then returned to the Talent Bank for filing after the computer operator entered the relevant data about 
the candidates into the Talent Bank computer. (Jan. Tr. at 63-64, 150-53, 159; Maldonado at 35-37, 39-41 ; Luyanda at 5, 9-11, 
14.) A similar procedure obtained before the Talent Bank moved to 52 Chambers Street. Maldonado at 12-16, 19-21 . 
75 Jan. Tr. at 159-60; Maldonado at 44, 46-47, 78. 
76 J.2. Due to the passage of time and the brevity of the period in which this color-coding scheme was employed, Maldonado 
and Luyanda are less than clear about the meaning of the other colored folders. These witnesses, however, corroborated each 
other with respect to the existence of the color-coded folders, and they both are corroborated on that point by Padilla. Jan. Tr. 
at 89-91 . 
n For the most part, unreferred or 'streer resumes came to the Talent Bank through the mail. Politically referred resumes 
came to the Talent Bank from DeVincenzo's office and were often delivered by Hein. (Jan. Tr. at 150-51 .) They were received 
by DeVincenzo from a variety of sources, including the Mayor's special advisor John LoCicero and directly from political figures. 
78 Jan. Tr. at 151, 154; Luyanda at 8, 11 . 
79 Jan. Tr. at 159; Maldonado at 37. 
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regularly sent for classification ahead of street resumes.80 As Luyanda explained, the resumes 
from political figures were processed first "so that in the event that DeVincenzo inquired about 
a special candidate or a hot referral, we would be ready to give him an answer. "81 
Once the initial processing of resumes was completed and all relevant 
information concerning candidates, including the job titles they might qualify for, was entered 
into the computer, a candidate could be selected by the computer upon receipt of a vacancy 
notice indicating an agency's intention to hire for a particular job title.82 By entering the 
complete information concerning politically referred candidates ahead of the information 
concerning "street" referrals, politically referred candidates were accorded another advantage. 
When particularly "hot" referred candidates were received, Talent Bank staff 
sometimes bypassed the classification step altogether.83 Morales --- who had previously assisted 
Shapiro in his classification duties --- would seek to classify the candidate herself; she explained, 
on occasion, "[t]his is a hot person, and we have to try and classify him."84 "Street" candidates 
did not receive such attention. 
When the Talent Bank received a vacancy notice indicating that an agency was 
seeking to fill one or more vacancies in a particular job title, its computer generated a printout 
of the candidates who, on the basis of Shapiro's evaluations, were qualified for the title.85 On 
the printout, referred candidates were printed first, above an alphabetical listing of "street" 
referrals.86 The Talent Bank's staff was encouraged to and, depending on the number of can-
80 Jan. Tr. at 155-56; Maldonado at 76-n; Luyanda at 12. 
81 Jan. Tr. at 156. With respect to the Talent Bank's computer, the initial step in processing involved 'logging' into the 
computer basic information about the candidates. Here, too, politically referred resumes fared better than street resumes. 
(luyanda at 34.) Shortly after her appointment as Talent Bank Director, Padilla obtained a report with respect to the backlog of 
resumes awaiting 'logging.' This report discloses that of the 50 pending batches of resumes, all 18 'Referral Batches' had been 
logged but only 15 of the 32 'Street Batches' had been logged into the computer. (Padilla Feb. at 88-89.) Luyanda also testified 
that there was a 'consistent' backlog of street resumes awaiting classification. Jan. Tr. at 156. 
82 Jan. Tr. at 63-64. 
83 Jan. Tr. at 156-57; Luyanda at 14. 
84 Jan. Tr. at 157. 
85 Jan. Tr. at 64-65, 160-61; Luyanda at 21-22. 
86 Jan. Tr. at 161; Luyanda at 22. Initially, the name of the referral source was entered into the Talent Bank's computer. 
Eventually, however, a code - generally an abbreviation· of the source's name beginning with its first letter - was entered 
instead. (Jan. Tr. at 78-79; 115-16; Maldonado at 81, 84, 86; Padilla Sept. at 28.) The code for 'street' referrals was 'ZGEN.' 
The apparent and perhaps intended consequence of using a code for 'street' referrals that began with the last letter of the alphabet 
was to cause the 'street' referrals to be printed out below all others. 
-· 
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didates who met the qualifications for the particular vacancy, aid in fact give preferences to the 
referred candidates in selecting the candidates who were to be forwarded to the hiring agency 
for its consideration.87 
Specifically, Morales instructed Luyanda to obtain candidates from the top list 
first.88 If Luyanda could obtain enough names from that list,89 she "wouldn't need to bother 
with the second list."90 It "was not a priority" to take into consideration gender, ethnicity or 
disability in selecting the candidates to be forwarded to the hiring agency.91 
Padilla felt pressure from De Vincenzo and his staff to refer to agencies the 
politically referred resumes. Hein, for one, repeatedly told Padilla that the Talent Bank was 
not doing a good enough job in getting referred candidates placed.92 She was criticized if they 
were not circulated regularly, called regularly to see if they had been referred and directed to 
make sure that they were referred.93 The pressure was to place the politically referred 
candidates, not minorities, women, the handicapped, or Vietnam veterans.94 
Inquiries from DeVincenzo's office concerning the status of politically referred 
candidates were a daily event. Several times a day Talent Bank staff were required to answer 
inquiries concerning matters such as which agencies a candidate had been referred to, whether 
the candidate had been interviewed, what the outcome of the interview was or whether there 
were additional openings for which the candidate might be considered.95 Apart from evidencing 
87 Jan. Tr. at 91-93, 126, 135, 162; Luyanda at 22; Maldonado at 47, 67; Padilla Sept. at 53, 70-71. 
88 Luyanda at 22-23. 
89 When responding to a vacancy notice, the Talent Bank did not generally send more than six to eight candidates. (Jan. 
Tr. at 64-65.) Depending on the type of job, the Talent Bank might have less or more than six to eight candidates who might be 
qualified. 
90 Jan. Tr. at 162. 
91 !Q. at 185. In addition, there was no code to identify Vietnam veterans, notwithstanding the announced policy to aid them 
in obtaining positions. !Q. at 391. 
92 Padilla Sept. at 70-71. 
93 Jan. Tr. at 91, 93; Padilla Sept. at 53; Padilla Feb. at 122-23. 
94 Jan. Tr. at 126, 185. According to Maldonado and Luyanda, however, candidates referred by the Mayor's Minority Affairs 
and Hispanic Affairs Advisors were among the 'hot' candidates. Maldonado at 133; Luyanda at 14. 
95 Jan. Tr. at 93-97, 100-01, 164-65; Luyanda at 35-36; Maldonado at 51-52; Padilla Sept. at 55, 58-59; Padilla Feb. at 122-
23. 
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the importance DeVincenzo's office attached to referred candidates, these constant inquiries ---
which were frequently matters of urgency requiring immediate response --- disrupted the flow of 
Talent Bank work.96 As Padilla testified: 
There wasn't a day that didn't go by where I didn't have to go 
running around looking for somebody's resume, somebody who 
had been referred by somebody important and I had to drop 
everything to interview these people and I was harassed if they 
didn't get referred to jobs they qualified for, even though they 
might not have been appropriate for the job.97 
Special efforts to obtain jobs for referred candidates were also made after 
candidates had been sent to agencies. For example, Luyanda was told by Morales to try to 
"push" referred candidates by requesting additional interviews for different vacancies for "hot" 
candidates who had not initially been hired.98 Following that direction, Luyanda would 
sometimes seek to persuade agencies that the candidate was a very good one.99 Padilla was 
told to advise an agency that DeVincenzo would be upset if a candidate had not yet been hired 
or interviewed.100 One consequence of these efforts was, as Padilla testified, that agencies 
sometimes believed she was trying to "push" a politically referred candidate when she was 
actually emphasizing the qualifications of a candidate who was in fact a very good one.101 
Prior to the Talent Bank's move to 52 Chambers Street in February 1985, as 
Schwartz's testimony establishes, politically referred candidates benefitted from similar forms of 
preferential treatment. Lists of candidates, sometimes ordered in a specified priority, were 
forwarded by Mayor's Office staff to agencies.102 With respect to those lists containing priority 
orderings of candidates, the high-priority candidates were referred by political figures. For 
96 Luyanda ·at 36; Padilla Feb. at 122·23. For example, as Luyanda testified, the Talent Bank compu1er could not simul-
taneously search for information abou1 a candidate and perform its other functions. Accordingly, the constant requests from 
DeVincenzo's office for information abou1 referred candidates created a backlog in other computer work. Jan. Tr. at 164-65. 
97 Padilla Feb. at 122-23. 
98 Jan. Tr. at 165-66. 
99 Luyanda at 32. 
100 Jan. Tr. at 102. 
101 Padilla Sept. at 66. 
102 April Tr. at 115-17, 125-26, 128-29. Testimony from employees of the Department of Environmental Protection and the 





example, one list containing candidates referred by political figures and other sources, ranks the 
politically referred candidates ahead of the other candidates.103 And Schwartz sometimes 
received from DeVincenzo letters sent by political figures containing lists of candidates that the 
political figures themselves had ranked in priority order. Either these letters or lists 
incorporating the priority ordering of the letters would then be forwarded to an agency.104 
Schwartz received instructions from De Vincenzo from time to time that certain 
politically referred candidates had to be hired, should be pushed or reconsidered.105 And as 
Schwartz acknowledged, she would act on these instructions by telling agency personnel staff 
that particular candidates were important, that they should do their best to hire them, that she 
should be kept posted and by otherwise conveying that they should be hired.106 Schwartz was 
not aware of any candidate who was the subject of such efforts who did not obtain a job.107 
Correlatively, the comparative lack of attention paid to the Talent Bank's 
affirmative action goals is exemplified by Schwartz's testimony that following up on priority list 
candidates alone occupied a "couple of hours" of her time each day.108 She was not aware of 
any efforts made by persons under her to recruit candidates from minority, veterans or women's 
organizations.109 
103 !Q at 128. 
104 !Q. at 129-30. 
105 !Q. at 117, 125, 139-40. 
106 !Q. at 139-40. 
107 !Q. at 144. 
108 !Q. at 147. 
109 !Q. at 149-50. 
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4. Laborer Positions 
Among the titles of interest to the Mayor's Office were manual laborers' titles. 
Many of the manual laborer positions in the City require few qualifications but pay well; some 
in excess of $20,000 a year plus opportunities for overtime pay. Far from being open to all 
City residents these jobs were, at least until 1986, largely the province of politically referred 
candidates who were predominantly white males. DeVincenzo's office played a decisive role in 
the process by which these jobs were dispensed. 
When agencies, chiefly DEP and DOT, advised DeVincenzo's office of their 
plans to hire laborers, Peter Gilvarry110 would submit a handwritten list containing the names of 
potential laborer candidates to DeVincenzo. The names on these lists were overwhelmingly 
derived from political figures. On these lists, Gilvarry wrote only the names of the candidates 
and their referral source. DeVincenzo, not the Talent Bank computer, then determined which 
of the prospective candidates would be forwarded to the agency; the testimony indicates that 
the Talent Bank's affirmative action goals played little if any role in this process.111 
G_ilvarry obtained the names of laborer candidates from a variety of sources: 
letters from political figures, lists from the office of John LoCicero, the Mayor's special advisor, 
the Talent Bank and non-political sources. The largest single source, however, was the letters 
from political figures that were forwarded to Gilvarry by DeVincenzo. Neither these letters, 
nor the lists that came from LoCicero's office contained any notations concerning the ethnicity 
of the candidates. And Gilvarry correctly believed that the names on the lists sent by 
LoCicero's office had in turn been .obtained from county leaders and other political figures. 112 
The evidence also suggests that DeVincenzo determined which potential 
candidates would be referred to agencies on the basis of political criteria. Most significantly, 
apart from a candidate's name, referral source information was the only other information 
Gilvarry recorded on the lists he submitted to DeVincenzo.113 
110 From January 1978 until mid-1985, when he assumed different responsibilities in City Hall, Peter Gilvarry was one of 
the members of DeVincenzo's staff responsible for reviewing PARs submitted by mayoral agencies. 
111 April Tr. at 256-61 . 
112 jg.at257-58. 




By 1983, if not earlier, LoCicero and his executive assistant, Jerry Skurnick, 
regularly contacted the office of Democratic county leaders in Staten Island, Queens, Brooklyn, 
and the Bronx and other political figures to invite them to submit names of candidates for 
laborer positions.114 Because the Manhattan Democratic County Leader was an opponent of 
the Mayor, however, he was not invited to submit candidates.115 
Although LoCicero testified that he always asked county leaders to submit names 
of minority candidates, he acknowledged that Skurnick was the one who generally contacted the 
county leaders. Skurnick, who testified that increasing the number of women and minorities 
was not a major component of the Talent Bank, acknowledged that he seldom asked the 
representatives of the county leaders with whom he dealt to submit minority candidates.116 
Since these county leaders did not indicate the ethnicity of their candidates when they 
submitted them, LoCicero and Skurnick had little means of ascertaining whether they were 
submitting minority candidates.117 And whatever efforts were made by LoCicero's office to 
obtain candidates from political figures who were members of minority groups, they were clearly 
insufficient to counter-balance the overwhelming numbers of white male candidates. 
A 1978 mayoral directive sought to broaden the pool of applicants for City jobs 
by requiring agencies to post all job vacancies. But, as discussed in Sections II and III below, 
the two agencies hiring the largest number of laborers, DEP and DOT, did not comply with this 
directive. Rather, compliance was waived by DeVincenzo's office. The candidates referred by 
the Mayor's Office, accordingly, did not compete with the general public for these well-paid, 
minimum skill jobs. 
5. "Special" Referrals 
Even prior to the creation of the Talent Bank, DeVincenzo's office regularly 
referred job candidates to agencies. Members of DeVincenzo's staff, particularly the aides who 
assisted him in the exercise of his oversight authority over agency personnel actions, were 
charged with the task of finding jobs for these candidates. 
114 J.s!.. at 168. 
115 J.s!.. at 174. In part for this reason, residents of Manhattan were drastically underrepresented in DEP's and DOT's laborer 
work force. 
116 April Tr. at 180, 207. 
117 J.s!.. at 181 . 
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From the time he first assumed responsibilities for PAR review, Peter Gilvarry 
was given the additional responsibility of trying to find jobs for persons who were referred to 
him by DeVincenzo.118 The other members of DeVincenzo's staff doing PAR reviews, such as 
Hein, also endeavored to find jobs for these "special" referrals. Indeed, Gilvarry and Hein 
"worked" the same candidates;119 Hein would seek to place them at the agencies whose PARs 
he handled and Gilvarry at the agencies whose P ARs he handled. These candidates, unlike 
Talent Bank canqidates, were not referred to agencies in response to vacancy notices from the 
agencies. Rather, they were generally forwarded for a wide variety of positions, including 
laborer jobs, to the larger agencies; these agencies were usually under full capacity and thus 
were able to accept candidates in positions for which they had not previously submitted vacancy 
notices.120 
Gilvarry's efforts to place these candidates sometimes began when DeVincenzo 
or another of his aides introduced him to a candidate sitting in the hall outside DeVincenzo's 
office.121 Otherwise, he received their resumes from DeVincenzo. If the particular positions 
for which they were to be considered had not already been determined, De Vincenzo would 
direct that the candidates be sent to Harry Shapiro. Shapiro would then interview the 
candidate and determine the job titles for which he or she might be qualified.122 
Gilvarry generally knew the referral sources of these candidates and 
acknowledged that at least some of them were referred by political figures. Gilvarry learned 
the referral source either through a cover letter from a political figure accompanying the 
resume or by being told the name of the political figure by the candidate.123 Gilvarry knew 
that others had been referred by LoCicero's office either on the basis of memos from 
LoCicero's office accompanying resumes or subsequent inquiries concerning candidates from 
LoCicero's office. With respect to these candidates, Gilvarry assumed that they had been 
118 12· at 255-57. 
119 Gilvarry at 47·50, 288-89, 304--05. 
120 12· at 269-70. 
121 12· at 264. 
122 12· at 263-65. 
123 12· at 266-67. 
-· 
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referred to LoCicero's office by political figures. 124 Gilvany tetained whatever information he 
received or noted about the referral sources and so was able to respond to inquiries about the 
status of candidates from De Vincenzo which were sometimes phrased in terms of the name of 
the candidate's referral source rather than the name of the candidate.125 
DeVincenzo expected quick action on these "special" referrals. Indeed, partly on 
the basis of receiving inquiries about their status from De Vincenzo so shortly after first 
receiving them --- often within a day or two --- Gilvany felt pressure to place them.126 During 
the years in which he was performing PAR review, January 1978 to mid-1985, Gilvany 
estimated that he received between 1 and 5 or 6 of these "special" referrals per month but 
none in some months.127 · 
According to Gilvarry, he and Hein were generally successful in obtaining jobs 
for these candidates.128 Even if Gilvarry and Hein did not purposefully seek to push agencies 
into hiring these candidates, their importance was certainly conveyed to agencies.129 These 
candidates, after all, were handled not by the Talent Bank staff but by DeVincenzo's PAR staff 
and their status was regularly monitored. And, moreover, posting requirements were waived for 
these candidates. 
6. The Ethnicity And Gender Of Talent Bank Hires 
A comparison of the ethnicity and gender of the Talent Bank's placements with 
the ethnicity and gender of discretionary City-wide hires is revealing. In fiscal year 1983-84, 
48.7% of the City's discretionary hires were members of minority groups as compared to 39.5% 
124 April Tr. at 256-57. 
125 Gilvarry at 301, 309· 11. 
126 !.£. at 301. Padilla and Ellin Hauser, a Mayor's Office employee who was charged with overall responsibility for the 
Talent Bank for a four· or five-month period in late 1986 and early 1987, testified to feeling similarly pressured by inquiries from 
DeVincenzo and members of his staff about candidates who they had met or whose resumes they had received just a day or two 
before. 
127 Gilvarry at 263, 288. The personnel staff at DEP who regularly handled these 'specials,' the term by which they referred 
to them, estimated that DEP received an average of five per month (See n. 235 below). DOT officials estimated that they received 
anywhere from a 'couple' to as many as ten each month. See n. 316 below. 
1213 Gilvarry at 269. 
129 Testimony from DEP personnel regarding their perception of the possible consequences of not hiring City Hall candidates 
is discussed in Section II, below. 
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of the Talent Bank's placements (145 of 367); in fiscal year 1984-85, 51.6% of the City's 
discretionary hires were minorities compared to 50.3% of the Talent Bank's placements (238 of 
473); and in fiscal year 1985-86, 54.3% of the City's discretionary hires were minorities 
compared to 51.2% of the Talent Bank's placements (208 of 406). Similarly, in fiscal year 
1983-84, 46% of the City's discretionary hires were women compared to 26.7% of the Talent 
Bank's placements (98 of 367); in fiscal year 1984-85, 45.3% of the City's discretionary hires 
were women compared to 27.3% of the Talent Bank's placements (129 of 473); and in fiscal 
year 1985-86, 46.5% of the City's discre~ionary hires were women compared to 35.5% of the 
Taler.t Bank's placements (144 of 406).130 
Notwithstanding that a major objective of the Talent Bank was to promote the 
hiring of minorities and women, it did not do as well as the City as a whole in each of these 
years.131 
D. The Purging Of Referral Source 
Information From The Talent Bank 
The sworn testimony of Padilla, Maldonado and Luyanda, corroborated by 
documents and the sworn testimony of others, establishes that on a day either in late January 
or early February of 1986, the Talent Bank's files and computers were purged of all records 
revealing the referral source of Talent Bank candidates. Led by Hein, Talent Bank staff and 
other members of DeVincenzo's staff destroyed documents indicating the referral source of 
Talent Bank candidates, removed the referral source codes from the Talent Bank computer and 
thereby at~empted to eliminate any evidence suggesting that the Talent Bank gave preferential 
treatment to politically referred candidates. 
Before nine o'clock that morning, Hein telephoned Padilla telling her to "drop 
everything" and that it was a "top priority" to remove all source references from the Talent 
Bank.132 After leaving a message for Morales, the Talent Bank's coordinator, to the effect that 
she had to speak with her, Padilla left for a meeting.133 When Padilla arrived at the Talent 
130 Charts and statistical tabulations relating to these placement statistics are collected in Attachment F. 
131 As noted below, the Talent Bank"s referrals for laborer positions at DEP and DOT in the years 1984 and 1985 resulted 
in these positions being filled overwhelmingly by white males. See Attachments G (DEP) and H (DOT) for the relevant statistical 
breakdowns. 




Bank later that morning, the work had already begun.134 
·-
When he arrived at the Talent Bank that morning, Hein appeared upset135 and, 
after speaking privately with Morales, told the Talent Bank staff, including Morales, Luyanda, 
Maldonado, Williams and others, that they were to stop what they were doing and go through 
the Talent Bank files and remove all documents which made reference to referral source.136 
Luyanda recalled further instructions from Morales that they were to "destroy all incriminating 
evidence that would point out that there had been political referrals being made and that 
special preference was given to those people."137 
The staff, accordingly, spent the entire working day going through files, teai-ing 
up and throwing out all documents containing indicia of referral sources, including cover letters, 
resume cover sheets and, in some cases, resumes.138 
The colored file folders , used to distinguish candidates on the basis of their 
referral source, were also tom up and discarded,139 but Hein directed the staff to check with 
him or Morales before destroying the contents of the red folders signifying the particularly "hot" 
referrals.140 
The door to the Talent Bank was kept closed and, at times, locked.141 Access 
to the Talent Bank was restricted and a special knock used to gain entry.142 Ellin Hauser, a 
134 !Q. at 112· 13. 
135 Maldonado at 96. 
136 !Q. at 97-99. 
137 Luyanda at 41 . 
138 Jan. Tr. at 113, 171-72. Some of the resumes in the files bore handwritten notations of the referral source. (Maldonado 
at 124.) These resumes were thrown out after the Talent Bank staff made copies, cleansed of the referral source notations. !Q. 
139 Jan. Tr. at 113, 171-72, 174. 
140 Maldonado at 103. Because of the volume of red folders, however, they were put aside by the staff and Hein and 
Morales reviewed them before destroying documents in the red folders. !Q. at 103-05. 
141 Jan. Tr. at 112, 186. 
142 !Q. at 186. 
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Mayor's Office employee, entered the Talent Bank that day but was ordered out by Hein.143 
Before leaving, Hauser saw Talent Bank staff ripping up folders and heard someone in the 
room ask how she had gained admittance, commenting that Hauser had not used "the knock."144 
Referral source information was also removed from the Talent Bank computer 
that day. Padilla, Maldonado and Luyanda all testified that Helen Mosley, the computer 
specialist who had programmed the Talent Bank computer, spent at least several hours in the 
Talent Bank that day removing referral source data from the computer.145 Hein testified that 
he asked Mosley to delete referral source information from the computer.146 
Files in at least one other office were also searched for referral source materials 
that day. Harry Shapiro, who evaluated and classified resumes of Talent Bank candidates, had 
a nearby office in 52 Chambers Street. His files, according to Maldonado who had previously 
been his secretary, contained resumes and other materials rel~ting to candidates he had 
personally interviewed.147 Maldonado recalled that someone searched Shapiro's files, removed 
some documents from the files and brought them into the Talent Bank where they were 
deposited into one of several plastic garbage bags that were used to discard Talent Bank 
referral source records.148 Barry Skolnick, who shared Shapiro's office, also testified that Hein 
went into the office and examined Shapiro's resume files; he stated that he was not sure, 
however, whether Hein or anyone else removed any of Shapiro's files. 149 
Hein also directed Padilla to remove from her office all materials containing 
143 Hauser at 69-70. 
144 !.Q. at 70. 
145 Jan. Tr. at 115-16, 175; Maldonado at 122. 
146 Jan. Tr. at 396. Although Mosley acknowledged that Hein asked her to delete referral source information from the 
computer and that she spent several hours working on the computer she testified that she did not remove all of the referral source 
data from the computer. (April Tr. at 342-46; Mosley at 175-76.) Rather, Mosley testified that she altered the referral source 
information, changing the names of the sources into four-letter abbreviations of their names. (April Tr. at 344.) Copies of the 
Talent Bank computer printouts in the Commission's possession that were generated at least several weeks before the day Talent 
Bank records were destroyed, however, contain these abbreviations. (Attachment I.) Furthermore, Padilla and Maldonado testified 
that the abbreviation codes for referral sources were used long before that day. (Padilla Sept. at 22-24; Maldonado 80-82.) 
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that all referral source information was removed from the Talent Bank computer as well 
as from its files on the day in question. 
147 Maldonado at 118. 
148 !.Q. at 118-20. 
149 Skolnick at 111-12, 166-67, 169-71 . 
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referral source information.150 Because she was further instru~ted not to throw such materials 
into the office trash, she took home with her the Black Book, Talent Bank computer printouts 
and other documents.151 
The purging of the Talent Bank's files and computer took up the entire day and 
continued into the evening.152 The garbage bags containing referral source materials were 
taken out of the Talent Bank during the course of the day and put into Rein's car. In his 
public testimony, Hein stated that he took the garbage bags home to Yonkers with him because 
trash was not scheduled to be picked up until the next day and due to "the sensitivity and the 
amount of the stuff in the bags, I did not want those papers flying all over Chambers Street the 
next morning."153 
Regardless of what may have prompted the purging of referral source documents, 
it was initiated by DeVincenzo. In his public testimony, Hein stated that DeVincenzo initiated 
it by telling him, in substance, to "make sure that the Talent Bank doesn't have any referral 
sources in it."154 Although Hein also testified that he did not discuss the removal of source 
documents with DeVincenzo during the course of the day,155 Maldonado testified that she 
recalled Hein receiving a phone call from De Vincenzo in the morning and that Hein was called 
out of the Talent Bank in the afternoon to speak with DeVincenzo.156 Padilla, moreover, 
testified that she overheard Hein giving a status report over the telephone on the progress of 
the efforts to remove source material and that Hein told her he had been speaking to 
DeVincenzo after he hung up the telephone.157 
Those who assisted in the destruction of referral source materials were instructed 
150 Jan. Tr. at 118. 
151 Id. at 118-19. There is also evidence, albeit inconclusive, that documents in Room 1 in City Hall were also discarded 
that day. l.uyanda testified that Monica Fung, a Mayor's Office employee who worked in Room 1, was present in the Talent 
Bank that day and, referring to the destruction of documents in the Talent Bank, said 'ti you think its bad here, you should see 
over at City Hall, it's chaos.' Jan. Tr. at 174. · 
152 Jan. Tr. at 116; Luyanda at 44. 
153 Jan. Tr. at 425. Similarly, Maldonado recalled that Hein stated that the garbage bags should not be disposed of at 52 
Chambers Street explaining that he was concerned reporters might go through the garbage. Maldonado at 115-16. 
154 Jan. Tr. at 435. 
155 !£. at 429 
156 Maldonado at 109-10. 
157 Jan. Tr. at 116-17. 
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not to speak of the events of that day. Maldonado testified that Hein said they should "leave 
that day, like, off the record, not to mention it at all, a day like it never happened."158 
Luyanda recalled that Morales advised her the next day not to mention anything about the 
events of the preceding day explaining that if anyone found out the Talent Bank would be shut 
down and the staff would lose their jobs.159 Regardless of whether Hein or Morales were the 
individuals who instructed the participants to deny the events of that day, such instructions were 
given and followed by several of the participants, including when they were questioned under 
oath by the Com.mission. 
The destruction of Talent Bank documents containing referral source information 
was not part of a regular practice designed to keep Talent Bank files up-to-date. Rein's public 
testimony that stale resumes (~ ones more than six months old) were purged from the files, 
as they had been in the past, along with referral source documents,160 is at odds with the 
testimony of Padilla, Maldonado and Luyanda. Maldonado testified that the destruction of 
Talent Bank records that day was not related in any way to any practice of removing stale 
resumes from the files and that efforts to remove stale resumes did not begin until the latter 
part of 1986.161 Similarly, Luyanda testified that she did not recall any regular cleaning out of 
old resumes occurring prior to the destruction of referral source materials.162 And Padilla 
testified that although there was a "theoretical[]" policy to get rid of stale resumes, old resumes 
were never thrown out but rather were retained in an inactive file. 163 
Other evidence before the Commission suggests that old resumes were not 
thrown out and that the Talent Bank's efforts to update files were desultory even after early 
1986. Charles Miller, a public records officer for ·the Ne~ York City Department of Records 
and Information Services, conducted a survey of Talent Bank records over the course of several 
months beginning in November, 1987.164 Among the records Miller surveyed were six cubic 
158 Maldonado at 117-18. 
159 Jan. Tr. at 1 n; Luyanda at 51-52. 
160 Jan. Tr. 423-24, 431-34. 
161 Maldonado at 126-28. 
162 Luyanda at 48-49. 
163 Jan. Tr. at 125; Padilla Sept. at 47-48. 




feet of folders relating to inactive Talent Bank candidates dating back to 1985.165 In a written 
"Recommendation Statement," moreover, Miller recommended that closed candidate folders be 
"weeded out twice annually." In his conversations with Talent Bank staff, Miller was never told 
that the Talent Bank was already weeding out inactive folders on a regular basis.166 
Salvatore Salamone, the Director of Management Information Systems at the 
Department of General Services, began an audit of the Talent Bank in the late spring or early 
summer of 1987 at DeVincenw's request.167 On the basis of some twelve to fifteen meetings 
with Hein, Padilla and others he prepared a "Top/Down Analysis" of the Talent Bank.168 In his 
analysis, Salamone identified a number of items that Hein, Padilla and the others all agreed 
were problems at the Talent Bank.169 One such problem was "We don't purge files systemati-
cally."170 Salamone was never told during the course of his meetings with Talent Bank staff 
that the Talent Bank had any policy with respect to purging files. 171 
E. The Talent Bank's Improved Affirmative Action Performance 
In part as a result of changes in the procedures by which the Talent Bank 
obtained and referred candidates for laborer positions and changes in the procedures by which 
agencies hired laborers, the Talent Bank's affirmative action performance began to improve in 
1986. In fiscal years 1983-84, 1984-85 and 1985-86, as previously noted, the Talent Bank's 
placements reflect a lower percentage of women and minorities hired than the percentage of 
women and minorities hired in these years by the City as a whole.172 But in fiscal year 1986-
87, for the first time, the Talent Bank's minority placement performance exceeded that of the 
City. In this year, 68.3% of the Talent Bank's placements were members of minority groups as 
compared with the 58.5% of the City's discretionary hires who were members of minority 
165 !.Q. at 7-9. 
166 Miller at 12-13. 
167 Salamone at 3-4, 6. 
168 !.Q. at 11-14, 20. 
169 !.Q. at 12-13, 31 . 
170 !.Q. at 37. 
171 !.Q. at 38. 
172 See the comparison set forth at pages 26-27 above. 
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groups.173 
Changes in Talent Bank procedures relating to laborer hiring were prompted 
when First Deputy Mayor Brezenoff learned in late 1984 or early 1985, but in any event riot 
later than February 1985, that a disproportionate number of white males had been getting 
laborer jobs paying in excess of $20,000.174 DeVincenzo informed Brezenoff that the over-
representation of white males was "attributable in part because of the nature of the referrals 
which were coming very heavily from elected and political officials and unions and Vietnam 
veterans ..... "175 More specifically, Brezenoff learned that the majority of laborer referrals were 
coming from county leaders.176 
Brezenoff, accordingly, instructed DeVincenzo to take a number of steps to 
improve the placement of minorities and women. He directed DeVincenzo to increase his 
efforts at expanding the Talent Bank's referral sources by using TAP centers, women's 
organizations and the Mayor's Advisors for Black and Hispanic Affairs.177 He also told 
DeVincenzo to tell the Talent Bank's existing referral sources, including county leaders, that 
they would have a better chance of obtaining jobs for their nominees if they were minorities or 
women.178 
By the summer of 1986, however, Brezenoff had concluded that insufficient 
progress had resulted from these steps and determined, with the concurrence of the Mayor, to 
take "fundamental action."179 The Talent Bank thus became, around August of 1986, the 
exclusive source for laborer candidates and agencies were required to hire only from lists of 
· candidates provided by the Talent Bank.180 
173 The Talent Bank's placement of women, however, continued to lag behind the City in fiscal year 1986-87. See 
Attachment F. 
174 April Tr. at 476-77; Brezenoff at 61-62, 79-83, 119-20. 
175 April Tr. at 477. 
176 April Tr. at 478-79. 
177 April Tr. at 475-80; Brezenoff at 59-60, 120-21. 
178 April Tr. at 480; Brezenoff at 120-21 . 
179 April Tr. at 475. 





Mayor Koch did not learn from Brezenoff until"sometime in 1986 "that a 
disproportionate number of the laborers hired through the Talent Bank were white males,"181 
that "laborer jobs, in large numbers, not exclusively, were filled by having calls made to political 
leaders to tell them there were jobs available"182 or that LoCicero had been making such 
calls.183 In early 1987, Mayor Koch directed another change: the implementation of a lottery 
system for the selection of the Talent Bank laborer candidates who would be forwarded to 
agencies when agencies planned to hire laborers.184 
Apart from these changes relating to laborer po~itions, the Talent Bank changed 
in other ways in 1986. Following the destruction of records in early 1986, referral source 
information was no longer stored in the Talent Bank computer or in the individual candidate 
files. 185 And Padilla observed a greater concern on DeVincenzo's part about the placement of 
women and members of minority groups through the Talent Bank.186 
F. The Role Of Joseph DeVincenzo 
Joseph DeVincenzo's dominant role in the patronage operations described above 
is established by the overwhelming weight of the evidence. His role is important to understand 
because he reported directly to Deputy Mayor Brezenoff, maintained close communication with 
the Mayor's Special Advisor John LoCicero, and exercised authority legally vested in the Mayor 
and delegated to him as a subordinate of the Mayor. 
The copies of the Talent Bank computer printouts furnished to the Commission 
by Schwartz and Padilla establish that the Talent Bank systematically recorded the referral 
181 April Tr. at 557. 
182 Koch at 74. 
183 April Tr. at 565-66. 
184 April Tr. at 487-88, 566. 
185 Talent Bank staff, however, were expected to keep track informally of referral sources. (Jan. Tr. at 122; Padilla Feb. at · 
53-54; Luyanda at 52.) Padilla was obliged to continue to report to DeVincenzo on the status and progress of particular 
candidates. (Jan. Tr. at 121-22.) While pressure from DeVincenzo's office to place 'specials' subsided following the purging of 
source documents, Padilla testified that by 1987 it had returned. (Jan. Tr. at 140-41; Padilla Feb. at 54-55.) Ellin Hauser also 
testified that during the period in which she was in charge of the Talent Bank (late 1987 and early 1988), a great deal of her day 
was spent interviewing 'specials' sent to her by DeVincenzo and members of his staff. (Hauser at 189-90.) In abou1 May, 1987, 
DeVincenzo suggested to Padilla and others that referral source information be pu1 back into the compu1er. Jan. Tr. at 141. 
186 Padilla Feb. at 107; Padilla Sept. at 90-91. 
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source of its candidates. The testimony of Padilla, Moffit, Mosley and others establish the 
existence of source information in the Talent Bank's computer and demonstrate DeVincenzo's 
knowledge of its existence. His top aides would not have undertaken on their own initiative to 
develop and operate Talent Bank computer systems containing such significant information as 
the political referral source of candidates. 
The resume cover sheets that Schwartz provided to the Commission establish 
that source information was integral to the Talent Bank's operation. They too spell out 
DeVincenzo's role in its operation. Several of them contain instructions and notations from 
DeVincenzo in his own handwriting.187 It is improbable that in reviewing these forms and 
writing these messages on them DeVincenzo could have failed to notice their "Source" space, 
particularly given its prominence on the forms. 
DeVincenzo's testimony that he accorded no preferences to candidates on the 
basis of political considerations is contradicted by other documents obtained from Schwartz. 
Various of these documents reflect determinations about the relative priorities to be accorded 
candidates referred by political figures and instructions that such candidates "must be hired," 
"pushed" or otherwise placed. Schwartz testified that DeVincenzo, not she, made these 
determinations and delivered these instructions and it is unlikely that a low-level City Hall 
employee could have been in a position to assess such political priorities and issue such 
directions. 
DeVincenzo's testimony that he either threw out or forwarded to LoCicero's 
office any letters he received from political figures referring job candidates is also contradicted 
by the documents in Schwartz's files. Her files contained more than thirty letters addressed to 
DeVincenzo or members of his staff from political figures referring job candidates. Schwartz 
testified that letters from political figures referring candidates and other documents disclosing 
the referral source of candidates were routinely forwarded to her by DeVincenzo.188 
Finally, the evidence established that DeVincenzo played a supervisory role in 
the early 1986 destruction of records. Hein did not act on his own initiative in directing this 
urgent and secret operation. In fact, Hein testified that DeVincenzo initiated the operation by 
instructing him to make sure that the Talent Bank's records contained no referral sources.189 
And Padilla testified that she overheard Hein's end of a telephone conversation that day 
187 April Tr. at 113-15. See,~. Attachment E. 
188 April Tr. at 136-37. 
189 Jan. Tr. at 429, 435. 
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between Hein and De Vincenzo in which Hein reported on the status of the operation.190 
190 Jan. Tr. at 116-17. 
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II 
THE MAYOR'S OFFICE AND THE 
PERSONNEL PRACTICES OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
During the period 1983-86, candidates referred by the Mayor's Office to the 
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") enjoyed numerous advantages over other 
candidates for jobs. Although precise figures cannot be determined, at least a substantial 
portion of Mayor's Office candidates were persons who had been referred by political figures. 
At times, various forms of pressure were brought to bear on DEP to hire these candidates and 
the oversight authority that DeVincenzo's office exercised over DEP's personnel actions played 
a key role in the placement of candidates referred by the Mayor's Office. 
A. The Mayor's Office's Authority Over DEP Laborer Hiring 
As DEP records establish, it hired some 197 laborers in 1984 and 1985.191 
·Tuese positions paid well in excess of $20,000 and offered opportunities for overtime.192 In 
theory, these jobs were open to all New York City residents who could pass a medical 
examination and possessed a valid driver's license.193 However, although a mayoral directive 
required that all job vacancies be posted, DEP did not post laborer vacancies.194 Nor did it 
advertise their existence.195 Rather, DEP notified only De Vincenzo's office when it planned to 
hire laborers.196 Sherri Roth and Marlene Hochstadt, currently Deputy Directors of Personnel 
at DEP, estimated that the overwhelming majority --- perhaps more than 90% --- of all laborer 
hires in the 1983-85 period were Mayor's Office referrals.197 And all laborers hired were 
191 See also Jan. Tr. at 194; Roth at 62-63. 
192 Jan. Tr. at 194; Hochstadt at 13-14. 
193 Jan. Tr. at 195; Roth at 71; Hochstadt at 13. 
194 Jan. Tr. at 208; Roth at 14, 15, 30; Hochstadt at 21-22, 96. 
195 Jan. Tr. at 208; Roth at 30; Hochstadt at 22. 
196 Jan. Tr. at 195; Roth at 14; Hochstadt at 18. 




subject to prior approval by DeVincenzo's office.198 Accordingly, as a practical matter, referral 
by the Mayor's Office ·was an additional requirement for a laborer job at DEP. 
After DEP notified DeVincenzo's office of its intention to hire laborers, DEP's 
personnel staff received lists of candidates from DeVincenzo's office.199 Sometimes one list was 
sent; sometimes a number of smaller lists were sent.200 At times, these lists bore notations 
indicating the names of the political figures who had referred the candidates.201 Less 
frequently, DeVincenzo's office also transmitted the names of candidates by simply forwarding 
to DEP letters from political figures and union representatives addressed to DeVincenzo or 
other Mayor's Office staff that contained listings of laborer candidates.202 Even when 
documents from the Mayor's Office did not indicate the names of the political figures who had 
referred candidates to the Mayor's Office, Roth and Hochstadt --- the DEP employees who 
regularly received and handled these lists --- sometimes learned the source of individual 
candidates from Fred Carfora, the then Deputy Commissioner for Administration at DEP.203 
Roth and Hochstadt would then record the source on the list or elsewhere.204 
According to Roth and Hochstadt, they did not always know who had first 
referred particular candidates to the Mayor's Office, nor did they think it important to know: 
what was important was that these candidates were the Mayor's Office's candidates.205 Roth, 
Hochstadt and others at DEP, however, believed that the Mayor's Office's candidates were 
predominantly those first referred by political figures.206 
198 Jean at 91. 
199 Jan. Tr. at 196-97; Roth at 11-14, 20-21, 24-26; Hochstadt at 36-37. 
200 Jan. Tr. at 197; Roth at 16, 24. 
201 Jan. Tr. at 199-200, 250-51; Roth at 20-21, 83-84; Hochstadt at 50. 
202 Jan. Tr. at 198-99, 248-50; Roth at 24. 
203 Jan. Tr. at 200; Roth at 20-21; Hochstadt at 56. When Carfora apprised them of the source of particular candidates, the 
source was a political figure. Roth at 21-23. 
204 Roth at 21-22. 
205 Jan. Tr. at 346-47; Roth at 20-21 ; Hochstadt at 50-53. 
206 Jan. Tr. at 254-55, 306-07; Hochstadt at 50-53, 204-05. 
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Candidates were individually interviewed for laborer positions at periodically 
conducted "pools," or mass interview sessions.207 Although the vast majority of candidates were 
Mayor's Office referrals, some arrived at the pools by other routes, including candidates 
referred directly to DEP by political figures; candidates referred by Vincent Parisi, a 
representative of District Council 37; and DEP "internals," candidates referred by DEP 
employees or who were themselves DEP employees seeking to obtain higher-paying laborer 
jobs.208 People who were not referred by one of these routes, but who merely sent letters to 
DEP asking to be considered for laborer jobs, were not interviewed.209 
At the hiring pools, all candidates were interviewed by DEP personnel staff and 
representative~ of the particular DEP bureaus seeking to fill vacancies.210 The candidates were 
rated on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 the highest. A score of 5 was the usual cutoff point; 
candidates rated below 5 were not hired and candidates who were rated 5 and above generally 
were hired. 211 
Candidates who were not referred by the Mayor's Office, but who were 
interviewed and rated anyway, had no real chance of obtaining jobs because the hiring of such a 
candidate was rarely approved.212 Rather, as demonstrated by DEP documents and the 
testimony of Roth and Carfora, DEP's regular practice was to hire only the Mayor's Office 
candidates. If the number of acceptable Mayor's Office candidates was insufficient to fill all the 
existing laborer vacancies, the excess vacancies remained unfilled until the Mayor's Office 
supplied additional candidates who were interviewed individually or at subsequent pools.213 
A June 1985 memorandum from Hochstadt to Carfora concerning a laborer pool 
conducted on June 5, 1985 illustrates this practice. DEP interviewed candidates for 35 
vacancies. Of the 31 Mayor's Office candidates interviewed, 18 were selected. DEP "felt 
207 Jan. Tr. at 197. 
208 Jan. Tr. at 198, 201, 211, 303; Hochstadt at 23, 32, 59, 61-62; Roth at 28, 32-33, 42, 53-54, 58 . 
209 Jan. Tr. at 202; Roth at 29, 31 . 
21 O Jan. Tr. at 208; Roth at 37-38; Hochstadt at 64. 
211 Jan. Tr. at 209; Roth at 38-39; Hochstadt at 65-66. 
212 Jan. Tr. at 206, 333-34; Hochstadt at 60-63; Roth at 53, 63. Indeed, Hochstadt testified that she could not recall any 
instances in which the requisite approval to hire a non-Mayor's Office candidate was obtained from DeVincenzo's office. Hochstadt 
at 62-63. 




obligated" to interview 14 candidates referred directly to it by elected officials and 12 of them 
were found acceptable. However, these 12 candidates were not hired even though they were 
qualified. Instead, Mayor's Office candidates with relatively low ratings were hired over other 
candidates with higher ratings.214 
After pools were conducted, DEP apprised members of DeVincenzo's staff which 
Mayor's Office candidates had been accepted and which rejected.215 Various efforts to "push" 
one or more of the rejected candidates followed every pool.216 Members of DeVincenzo's staff 
sought explanations of the reasons why particular candidates had not been selected, explaining 
at times that DeVincenzo wanted to know or that DeVincenzo was very interested in the 
particular candidate.217 Hochstadt, Roth and others provided the explanations, either 
immediately on the basis of their records or after checking with the representatives of the DEP 
bureaus who had interviewed the candidates.218 These explanations were rarely sufficient.219 
Sometimes within twenty minutes of providing an explanation, members of 
DeVincenzo's office (including Schwartz, Gilvarry and Hein) would either call back and say that 
the reasons were not good enough or that they were under pressure from DeVincenzo, or 
otherwise communicate a request that the rejected candidate be reconsidered.220 
Hochstadt and Roth, accordingly, were obliged to contact the relevant DEP 
bureau. They would explain that the Mayor's Office was pushing a particular candidate and 
either ask for more information or request that the candidate be accepted.221 Depending upon 
the bureau's response, second and third telephone calls between DeVincenzo's office and DEP's 
personnel staff might follow.222 These efforts sometimes but not always resulted in the hiring 
214 Jan. Tr. at 217-18; Hochstadt at 84; Roth at 85-86. 
215 Jan. Tr. at 212-13; Roth at 36; Hochstadt at 71 . 
216 Jan. Tr. at 212·14; Roth at 36, 43-44; Hochstadt at 72-74. 
217 Jan. Tr. at 212-15; Roth at 36, 44-45; Hochstadt at 71 , 75. 
218 Jan. Tr. at 213; Roth at 36; Hochstadt at 75-76. 
219 Jan. Tr. at 213; Roth at 49-51. 
220 Jan. Tr. at 213-15; Roth at 49-51; Hochstadt at 76-77. 
221 Jan. Tr. at 216; Roth at 46-49, 52 ; Hochstadt at 78, 82-83. 
222 Roth at 36-37, 39-40. 
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of a previously rejected candidate.223 Occasionally, moreover, Hochstadt and Roth would learn 
from Carfora that a Mayor's Office candidate who had not been acceptable to the bureau was 
acceptable or was to be scheduled for a medical examination, a prerequisite for employment.224 
Accordingly, they believed that persons above them at DEP had been contacted by DeVincenzo 
or his staff in continuing efforts to get jobs for candidates who were apparently of particular 
importance to the Mayor's Office.225 
The rating process was also influenced by the Mayor's Office. Because it was 
difficult to defend a decision not to select a marginally rated Mayor's Office candidate, DEP 
regularly adjusted the ratings of those Mayor's Office candidates who received a marginal rating. 
Thus, a candidate who had been rated a "5" might have his rating adjusted down to a "4" and 
be rejected or up to a "6" and be accepted. In this manner, DEP sought both to preempt 
efforts from DeVincenzo's office to push rejected Mayor's Office candidates and to enhance its 
ability to respond to such efforts.226 
Although DEP did not post or advertise laborer vacancies, some members of the 
general public became aware of vacancies nonetheless. In addition to those who wrote letters 
to DEP,227 interested persons came to DEP's offices several times a month.228 Cassandra 
Kennedy, an employee of DEP's Recruitment Unit, received inquiries from persons who walked 
in off the street.229 Knowing that it was pointless for her to do so, Kennedy explained that she 
could not accept their names or resumes.230 Although she was uncertain about whether she 
should tell them the truth, Kennedy advised them to try to obtain a letter of reference from a 
223 Jan. Tr. at 216-17; Roth at 38-40, 50; Hochstadt at 78-79, 83-84. 
224 Jan. Tr. at 216-17; Roth at 45, 49-50; Hochstadt at 78-79. 
225 !Q. Members of OeVincenzo's staff also telephoned DEP to provide names of candidates both before and after hiring 
pools were conducted. (Jan. Tr. at 197, 221; Roth at 18, 27.) Candidates whose names were thus obtained after pools were 
sometimes interviewed by Hochstadt or Roth. (Jan. Tr. at 221; Roth at 57-58.) Like the candidates interviewed at the hiring pools, 
some of these candidates were 'pushed' by OeVincenzo's office. Jan. Tr. at 221; Roth at 57-58. 
226 Jan. Tr. at 210-11; Roth at 40-43. 
227 Persons who wrote letters to DEP inquiring about laborer vacancies received a letter stating that their names would be 
kept on file. They did not obtain interviews. Jan. Tr. at 202; Roth at 28-30. 
228 Kennedy at 16, 19. 
229 !Q. 
230 !Q. at 17-18. 
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political source and hand-deliver the letter to Room 1 in City HaJJ. 231 The general response to 
her advice was a comment to the effect that "oh, so this is a politica1 thing."232 
DEP employees noted that the Mayor's Office's laborer candidates reflected a 
low percentage of women and minorities, and a high number of Staten Island residents.233 
DEP personnel records concerning its 197 laborer hires in 1984 and 1985 demonstrate the 
accuracy of these perceptions. In 1984, approximately 69% of DEP's laborer hires were white 
males, 29% were minority males and females, 31 % were Staten Island residents and 5% were 
Manhattan residents. Similarly, in 1985 approximately 65% of DEP's laborer hires were white 
males, 34% were minority males and females, 22% were Staten Island residents and 6% were 
Manhattan residents.234 
B. "City Hall Specials" · 
As often as five times a month, DEP received "special" referrals from 
DeVincenzo's office.235 Unlike Talent Bank or laborer candidates, these referrals were not sent 
in response to specific vacancy notices posted by DEP.236 Rather, they were candidates for 
whom DEP sought to find vacancies.237 DEP was generally understaffed and thus able to hire 
these "City Hall specials" (as they were referred to by DEP personnel staff) to fill vacancies 
that had not previously been posted, either because there were no immediate plans to fill the 
vacancies or because they had not gotten around to posting the vacancy notices.238 Since DEP 
was not required to post the vacancies for which "City Hall specials" were considered, the 
"specials" did not have to compete for these vacancies with other candidates.239 
231 !Q. at 17-18, 33. 
232 !Q. at 19. 
233 Jan. Tr. at 218, 289; Roth at 74-75; Kennedy at 27-28. 
234 For a more detailed analysis, see Attachment G. 
235 Jan. Tr. at 223; Roth at 106. 
236 Jan. Tr. at 222; Roth at 96; Hochstadt at 107. 
237 Jan. Tr. at 224; Roth at 123-24. 
238 Jan. Tr. at 227; Roth at 119-20; Hochstadt at 107-08. 
239 Jan. Tr. at 228-29; Roth at 116, 119-21; Hochstadt at 108-09. 
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Some "City Hall specials" --- those who were referred to DEP but not for a 
specific position --- enjoyed an additional advantage. DEP's personnel staff would interview 
these candidates or evaluate their resumes, or both, to determine the job titles for which they 
would be qualified.240 In this evaluation process, the salary that the "special" was looking for 
was sometimes crucial.241 DEP's staff would endeavor to find a job title for which they were 
qualified and which paid a salary commensurate with the amount sought by the "City H all spe-
ciaJ."242 
In contrast, no such attention was devoted to_ the members of the general public 
who, without specifying a particular position, mailed their resumes to DEP seeking employment. 
DEP received up to 500 resumes a week in the mail and roughly half of these resumes were 
not sent in response to vacancies posted or advertised by DEP.243 Rather, they were sent by 
people who expressed a general interest in obtaining employment at DEP.244 Because of the 
volume of these resumes, DEP's small personnel staff could do little more than place them in 
an inactive file after mailing letters advising that their resumes would be kept on file.245 
Some "City Hall specials" were pushed by DeVincenzo's office more than 
others.246 Roth and Hochstadt were told by Hein, Gilvarry, Schwartz and others that particular 
candidates ~ere "hot," "high priority" or "important."247 These candidates were the subjects of 
frequent follow-up calls.248 Members of DeVincenzo's staff would seek to learn the status of 
"City Hall specials" (U, whether they had been interviewed yet, when they would be 
interviewed, what the results of interviews were) and sometimes explained that DeVincenzo 
240 Jan. Tr. at 222-23; Roth at 98, 126-27, 131-33; Hochstadt at 103, 113-14, 119; Sullivan at 17. 
241 Roth at 105-06; Sullivan at 12-14. 
242 Jan. Tr. at 222-24; Hochstaclt at 113-16; Sullivan at 12-15, 17. 
243 Jan. Tr. at 202, 233; Roth at 131-32. 
244 !Q. 
245 Jan. Tr. at 202, 233; Roth at 131-32; Hochstadt at 117-19. 
246 Jan. Tr. at 223; Roth at 96, 99-101 ; Hochstadt at 99. 
247 Hochstadt at 120-21; Roth at 148-50. 
248 Hochstadt at 101-02, 216-18; Roth at 107-08 . 
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wanted to know or that they were being pressured by DeVince~zo.249 Gilvarry, in particular, 
would sometimes sound distraught when inquiring about the status of a referral.250 The 
importance of certain "City Hall specials" was also communicated by the frequency of telephone 
requests for updates on their status.251 For example, the same candidate might be the subject 
of more than one status request on the same day or status requests on successive days.252 
In addition to Hochstadt and Roth, Carfora also received resumes or other 
information relating to "City Hall specials" from DeVincenzo's office.253 At times in a 
distraught tone, Carfora would tell DEP personnel staff that he was getting a "lot of heat," or 
pressure about a particular candidate, that the candidate should be shopped around to the 
various bureaus or that a job should be found for the candidate.254 At times, DEP's personnel 
staff would be obliged to drop their other work and attend to the process of finding jobs for 
these candidates.255 
If a "special" was interviewed by a DEP bureau but the bureau did not want to 
hire the candidate, additional interviews at other bureaus or at the same bureau for the same or 
different positions would be arranged.256 Less frequently, members of DeVincenzo's staff would 
question or reject the reason why a bureau did not want to hire a candidate.257 And at least 
on some occasions, the bureau would then agree to hire the candidate.258 
249 Jan. Tr. at 224; Hochstadt at 99-100, 102-03, 111·12, 120-21 . 
250 Jan. Tr. at 224-25; Roth at 101. 
251 Hochstadt at 101, 216-17. 
252 Hochstadt at 101-02, 217-18. 
253 Hochstadt at 100, 113; Martin at 34-35; (Roger Martin was the DEP Personnel Director from 1983 to 1985.) Roth at 96, 
110-11. 
254 Jan. Tr. at 224-25, 280-81; Hochstadt at 113; Martin at 34·35; Roth at 101 , 103. 
255 Sullivan at 27. 
256 Jan. Tr. at 231, 233; Hochstadt at 104-05, 107; Roth at 111 . 
257 Hochstadt at 103-04; Roth at 109-10. 
258 Hochstadt at 104·05; Roth at 112-13. 
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If not as a result of the first interview, then as a result of second or third 
interviews, "City Hall specials" were hired by DEP.259 Indeed, except for occasional instances in 
which a "special" was hired by another agency, Roth could not recall a single instance in which 
a position was not found for the heavily pushed "specials" at DEP.260 
C. Talent Bank Candidates 
Talent Bank candidates were also pushed by the Mayor's Office.261 Cassandra 
Kennedy, who acted as DEP's liaison with the Talent Bank, regularly received telephone calls 
from Talent Bank staff seeking additional interviews for their candidates and she was often told 
that particular candidates were "hot" or "special."262 Like "City Hall specials," the status of 
some Talent Bank candidates was frequently monitored, and Talent Bank staff sometimes 
explained that De Vincenzo wanted the information or that they were under pressure to obtain 
it.263 
That DEP felt pressure from DeVincenzo's office with respect to Talent Bank 
candidates is also clear from DEP's handling of "candidate disposition sheets." When the 
interviewing process was completed, the bureau at DEP that was hiring for the particular 
vacancy filled out these forms, recording on them all the candidates interviewed, the results of 
the interviews and the reasons why rejected candidates were rejected and the other candidates 
selected.264 DEP's personnel staff then forwarded the candidate disposition sheets to 
DeVincenzo's office along with the Planned Action Report for the particular hire.265 If the 
candidate disposition sheet did not indicate that all Talent Bank candidates had been 
interviewed (or failed to state a sufficient explanation for not interviewing a particular 
259 Jan. Tr. at 226-27; Hochstadt at 105-07; Roth at 103, 111-12. 
260 Roth at 103. Although documents that DEP received from DeVincenzo's office may not have generally indicated the 
persons who had first referred the 'City Hall specials,' DEP personnel staff knew or assumed that at least some of them had been 
referred by political figures. (Hochstadt at 121-23; Roth at 99; Sullivan at 11-13.) As Gilvarry's testimony makes clear, see Section 
l.C.5, above, this assumption was correct. 
261 Jan. Tr. at 236-38; Roth at 107; Hochstadt at 144, 146-47. 
262 Kennedy at 39-41. 
263 J5!. 
264 Jan. Tr. at 236, 274; Martin at 37-38; Roth at 113. 
265 Hochstadt at 137, 143-44; Martin at 37-38. 
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candidate) or did not adequately explain why a Talent Bank can'didate was not selected, 
problems ensued. The hire would not be approved or the reasons why a Talent Bank candidate 
had not been selected would be questioned.266 
Accordingly, DEP's personnel staff took care to review the candidate disposition 
sheets when they were submitted by hiring bureaus.267 If a candidate disposition sheet 
indicated that a Talent Bank candidate was qualified but another candidate had been selected, 
Carfora "would bang the table and say 'If a person is a City Hall candidate [and] is qualified for 
the position, that person should be hired."'268 The paperwork would then be returned to the 
bureau. The message thus conveyed was that a qualified Talent Bank candidate should be 
hired even if that meant passing over a more qualified candidate.269 
Similarly, if a candidate disposition sheet failed to give a sufficient explanation 
for not interviewing or selecting a Talent Bank candidate, DEP's personnel ~taff would either 
contact the bureau and try to obtain an adequate explanation or return the paperwork to the 
bureau.270 On occasion, such "inadequate" paperwork was forwarded to DeVincenzo's office 
despite these screening efforts. And as Roger Martin, the then-DEP Personnel Director, 
explained, "Fred [Carfora] would be notified by City Hall and he would come flying down to my 
office and rant and rave about how inefficient and careless we were in letting that happen."271 
D. Leveraging Preferences: PAR Authority 
DeVincenzo's office exercised extensive oversight authority, primarily through 
review of P ARs, over DEP personnel actions. The various preferences that "City Hall specials" 
and Talent Bank candidates enjoyed in the hiring process at DEP were directly related to this 
oversight authority. DEP employees believed that in order to secure DeVincenzo's approval for 
266 Jan. Tr. at 235-38, 286; Hochstadt at 144-46; Martin at 67-68. 
267 Jan. Tr. at 247-48; Hochstadt at 152-54; Martin at 41-42, 45; Roth at 151-52, 154-56. Because they knew that they would 
not be questioned about the adequacy of the reasons given for not selecting candidates who had not been referred by the Mayor's 
Office, DEP's personnel staff reviewed only the explanations given for not selecting the Mayor's Office's candidates. Jan. Tr. at 
247-48; Hochstadt at 155-56; Roth at 142, 155-56. 
268 Jan. Tr. at 283. 
269 Jan. Tr. at 282-85; Martin at 41-43. 
27o Hochstadt at 153-55 ; Roth at 151-52, 154-55. 
271 Jan. Tr. at 284. 
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personnel actions, it was necessary to appease DeVincenzo by hiring City Hall candidates. 
DeVincenzo's oversight authority thus served as a lever by means of which these preferences 
were obtained. 
Every month DEP submitted a post-audit and a pre-audit package of P ARs to 
DeVincenzo's office. The post-audit package consisted of between 80 and 125 personnel 
actions that DEP could and did effectuate without DeVincenzo's prior approval. The pre-audit 
package consisted of between 15 and 25 proposed personnel actions; actions such as certain 
hires and promotions that DEP could not institute without the all-important "Jo_e D. letter."272 
Pre-audit P ARs were supposed to be turned around (i.e., approved, disapproved 
or returned for additional information) within a few weeks of their submission to DeVincenzo's 
office.273 Those submitted by DEP, however, were plagued by chronic delays. Most pre-audit 
P ARs were not approved within a month of their submission; generally it took a longer period, 
sometimes months longer, to secure an approval from DeVincenzo's office.274 Virtually every 
pre-audit package included actions that were subject to delays of up to six months.275 
Pre-audit P ARs relating to the hiring of "City Hall specials" or Talent Bank 
candidates, however, were not subject to such protracted delays. They were approved much 
faster.276 Thus, pre-audit P ARs relating to the hiring or promoting of a non-referred candidate 
--- and particularly those in which an existing DEP employee or an outside candidate was 
promoted or hired over a referred candidate --- were the ones that were most likely to be 
subject to extended delays.277 DEP's employees did not fail to draw the lesson: delays were 
attributable at least in part to the Department's failure to hire a sufficient number of referred 
candidates.278 
In response to Hochstadt's inquiries, members of DeVincenzo's staff assured her 
272 Jan. Tr. at 239·40; Roth at 135-36. 
273 Jan. Tr. at 240; Hochstadt at 150. 
274 Jan. Tr. at 240-43; Hochstadt at 150; Roth at 136. 
275 Hochstadt at 165. 
276 Jan. Tr. at 244; Hochstadt at 157-59; Roth at 143-44, 147. Prompt approval of a pre-audit PAR involving a 'City Hall 
special' or Talent Bank candidate was another of the advantages these referrals enjoyed. 
277 Jan. Tr. at 241-45; Hochstadt at 157-59; Roth at 163-64. 




that delays were not attributable to deficiencies in the preparation of DEP's P ARs.279 
Sometimes, no explanations were given and those that were provided were viewed as 
inadequate by DEP's personnel staff.280 At times, members of DeVincenzo's staff told 
Hochstadt that they had not yet reviewed or discussed with DeVincenzo long-delayed pre-audit 
submissions.281 Such inaction was alone sufficient, as Hochstadt testified, to "impl[y] to me that 
[DeVincenzo] didn't feel like looking at DEP's submissions" because he was dissatisfied with the 
agency.282 
The implicit was sometimes made explicit. The "stock" explanation that Gilvarry 
gave to Roth when she inquired about delayed P ARs was that "Joe was displeased either with 
the agency in general or with a particular 'action or with some other action which was holding 
up the rest of them."283 The cause of displeasure with the agency, as Roth understood, was 
DEP's failure to hire enough referred candidates and the cause of displeasure with a particular 
action was DEP's having chosen to hire or promote someone other than the Mayor's Office 
candidate. 284 
The dispositions that displeased DeVincenzo were not necessarily limited to pre-
audit hires of non-referred candidates. Most personnel actions were subject only to after-the-
fact or post-audit review and thus were beyond DeVincenzo's direct control. Accordingly, 
Hochstadt suspected that pre-audit actions may have been delayed because post-audit review by 
DeVincenzo's staff revealed other personnel actions in which referred candidates had not been 
hired.285 
Regularly, as often as every month, Carfora met with DeVincenzo in an effort to 
obtain approval of long-delayed PARs.286 Prior to these meetings, DEP's personnel staff would 
brief Carfora about the details of the delayed actions and the reasons why approvals were 
279 Hochstadt at 180-81. 
280 !.Q. at 159-60, 162. 
281 !.Q. at 162-64. 
282 !.Q. at 164. 
283 Roth at 141 . 
284 Jan. Tr. at 245-47; Roth at 141-43. 
285 Hochstadt at 172-73. Of course , the perception of such politicization is in and of itself important. 
286 Jan. Tr. at 276-77, 321-22; Hochstadt at 173-74; Roth at 160-61. 
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important to the agency.287 Because they understood that DEP had to "play ball" with City 
Hall by doing it favors and hiring Mayor's Office referrals, they also briefed Carfora about the 
recent hires of referred candidates.288 Carfora, in turn, used this information in his meetings 
with DeVincenzo to demonstrate the agency's cooperativeness and hopefully obtain approvals in 
return.289 
These demonstrations of cooperativeness were generally not successful in 
obtaining the requisite "Joe D. letter" approving delayed personnel actions.290 But sometimes 
approvals were obtained.291 Thus, the carrot of approval and the stick of delay led DEP to 
continue to play ball. 
287 Hochstadt at 174-75. 
288 Jan. Tr. at 319-20, 326-27; Hochstadt at 177-79. 
289 Js!. at 320-22. 
290 Js!. at 323-24. 
291 Hochstadt at 175-77; Roth at 161-62. 
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III 
THE MAYOR'S OFFICE AND THE PERSONNEL 
PRACTICES OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION 
The Mayor's Office also exercised extensive influence over the personnel actions 
of the Department of Transportation ("DOT') in the 1983-86 period. Vacancies in certain 
types of laborer positions were dominated by City Hall referrals and job candidates referred by 
City Hall enjoyed an array of advantages. 
A. Cooperating With The Mayor's Office 
Robert Jean, Joseph DeMarco and Marsha Singer, three DOT personnel officials 
in the 1983-86 period,292 agreed in their testimony that the relationship between DOT and the 
Mayor's Office was a cooperative one with respect to personnel matters.293 For DOT, coopera-
tion meant hiring and extending other favors for job candidates referred by the Mayor's Office. 
As Jean testified: 
Q And by "cooperating," that means taking some of [City 
Hall's] candidates? 
A Yes, playing the game the way it was supposed to be 
played. 
Q And the game was, that you take their candidates--
A The game was to help them out. Not to take everybody 
they sent, and not to turn it into a total patronage 
number, but take a reasonable number, our share as a 
department, or however you want to put it.294 
The oversight authority that DeVincenzo's office exercised over DOT's personnel 
292 During this time, Jean was the DOT Personnel Director; DeMarco was his deputy; and Singer was his staff assistant. 
293 April Tr. at 42-43, 89-90; Jean at 56, 91-92; DeMarco at 146; Singer at 124. 
294 Jean at 56. 
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actions was a decisive factor in DOT's cooperativeness. AB DeMarco testified, "[w]e had a 
large number of actions each month, and it wasn't conducive to business if you didn't cooperate 
with [the Mayor's Office]."295 Jean testified that he knew "that other agencies had problems 
with City Hall getting [personnel actions] approved, the time [delays], and all that," but DOT 
cooperated and did not have such problems.296 
In the belief that cooperation was important to fair and expeditious review of 
DOT's personnel .actions, DOT's officials cooperated by hiring and extending preferential 
treatment to City Hall candidates.297 
B. DOT Laborer Hiring 
Hiring in at least four laborer titles --- ferry agent, deckhand, assistant highway 
repairer and debris remover --- was dominated by candidates referred by the Mayor's Office.298 
No civil service list was in effect for these titles and, accordingly, provisionals were hired to fill 
vacancies.299 In general, DOT hired from lists of candidates sent by members of DeVincenzo's 
staff, usually Gilvarry or Hein.300 Some exceptions were allowed. If DOT had a candidate of its 
own and sought approval from DeVincenzo's office to have that candidate considered, approval 
was usually granted because of the cooperative relationship between DOT and DeVincenzo's 
office.301 
Jean, moreover, testified that Anthony Ameruso, then the Commissioner of 
DOT, instructed him to let him (Ameruso) know "if we w~re hiring any positions with a fairly 
large number of candidates where there was no education or experience requirements that City 
Hall might be interested in filling" so that Ameruso could make arrangements with DeVincen-
295 April Tr. at 89. 
296 Jean at 91; see also April Tr. at 42. 
297 April Tr. at 42-43, 89-90; Jean at 91-92; DeMarco at 38, 146; Singer at 124. 
298 April Tr. at 12, 15-17, 69-74. 
299 !£. at 14, 15, 74. 
300 !£. at 22-23, 78. 
301 J.2. at 23. 
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zo's office.302 By making such arrangements,303 Jean explained, DOT obtained "credit" with the 
Mayor's Office: "[i]t was credit for yourself, in a business sense, as an agency, and a credit for 
him, as a Commissioner, in a sense, with the political establishment."304 
DOT did not post vacancy notices for these job titles, and was not required to 
post by DeVincenzo's office, notwithstanding the 1978 mayoral directive requiring posting.305 
Rather, DOT regularly endorsed or stamped "posting waived" on P ARs relating to hires for 
these titles or indicated that the hire was a Mayor's Office candidate for whom posting was not 
necessary by writing out that fact or writing the letter "Z" on P ARs.306 Nor did DOT's 
personnel staff believe that there was anything improper about not complying with the 1978 
directive. As Jean testified, "[p ]osting for vacancies was a procedure established by the Mayor's 
Office. If City Hall told you you didn't have to post, then you didn't have to post."307 
Since DOT neither posted nor advertised vacancies in these laborer titles, 
candidates sent by the Mayor's Office did not compete with the general public. The hiring 
process at DOT for these positions was simple: absent exceptional circumstances, Mayor's 
Office candidates were hired.308 If DOT "rejected some [City Hall] candidates in favor of other 
candidates from City Hall," it would not encounter difficulties from DeVincenzo's office.309 
Thus, DOT could and did reject a City Hall candidate who may have "reek[ed] of alcohol" or 
"look[ed] like a bum."310 
302 J..Q. at 20-21. Jean testified that Ameruso also expressed uncertainty about whether he would be reappointed 
Commissioner after the 1985 mayoral elections. Jean at 91. 
303 Such arrangements were made from time to time. (Jean at 34-37.) For example, Jean and Singer both testified that 
an arrangement was made to have assistant highway repairer vacancies filled by candidates from the Mayor's Office and from the 
rank and file in a lower-paying position, the motor vehicle operators title. Jean and Singer believed that this arrangement was 
agreed upon by Ameruso, DeVincenzo and the union leadership representing the motor vehicle operators. April Tr. at 19; Jean 
at 35-30; Singer at 63-66. 
304 Jean at 91. 
305 April Tr. at 15-16, 69, 74. 
306 !.Q. at 81-82, 87. 
307 Jean at 27. 
308 April Tr. at 25, 75-76. 





At times, the lists of candidates forwarded by DeVincenzo's staff ranked the 
candidates in priority order.311 DOT's personnel staff understood that interviewing and hiring 
was to be done in accordance with the priorities stated on these lists.312 
DOT's personnel staff was not aware of any affirmative action component to the 
candidates DOT received from the Mayor's Office for these positions.313 The only impression 
that they had concerning the ethnicity of candidates referred by the Mayor's Office was that for 
Ferry Bureau jobs and the higher-paying, more desirable assistant highway repairer position, the 
candidates from the Mayor's Office were comprised mostly of white males, and that most of the 
minority candidates referred by the Mayor's Office were referred for the lower-paying and less 
desirable debris remover position.314 Statistics culled from DOT and Talent Bank records 
confirm that impression. For the calendar years 1984 and 1985, over 85% of assistant highway 
repairer, deckhand and ferry agent hires were white males. During the same period, over 70% 
of the hires for the debris remover position were members of minority groups or women.315 
C. "Special" Hires 
In addition to laborer candidates, DOT regularly received candidates from 
DeVincenzo's office for a variety of jobs and accorded them various preferences in the hiring 
process.316 A member of DeVincenzo's staff would call DOT and say that it was important 
that DOT find a job for the candidate or, in substance, state that a job should be found for the 
candidate.317 DOT, accordingly, would review the qualifications of the candidate and seek to 
determine if there were any vacancies in the job titles for which the candidate might be 
311 April Tr. at 78; see ~. Attachment J . 
312 Jean at 49-50. 
313 April Tr. at 83-84. 
314 ]2. at 27-28, 85-86. 
315 For a complete statistical breakdown of these positions by gender and ethnicity, see Attachment H. 
316 Jean testified that he was unsure about the frequency with which DOT received such candidates but estimated that DOT 
received a 'couple' each month and perhaps more frequently in 1985. (Jean at 69.) Singer 'guesstimated' that DOT received 
as many as ten each month. Singer at 95-96. 
31 7 Jean at 68; Singer at 92-93. 
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qualified. 318 
DOT sometimes "created" jobs for these candidates. That is, an agency as large 
as DOT often had budget authority for particular positions and, even though the bureaus at 
DOT which had such "vacancies" had no immediate plans to fill them, Mayor's Office candidates 
would be hired for these "vacancies."319 In other words, the Mayor's Office candidates 
preceded the bureaus' plans to fill such openings. More often, however, DOT was able to 
"slot" a Mayor's Office candidate into a vacancy which one of DOT's bureaus was seeking to 
fill.320 If the Mayor's Office candidate, however, was not qualified for the particular job title or 
was seeking a salary higher than the maximum amount payable for the job title, DOT 
sometimes changed the job title for the vacant position to accommodate the Mayor's Office 
candidate.321 Thus, the vacancy was adjusted to suit the candidate. 
Some of these candidates, moreover, were "musts."322 In other words, DOT had 
no discretion and had to hire the Mayor's Office candidate. As Jean testified, Ameruso could 
sometimes resist hiring particular Mayor's Office candidates but sometimes he could not.323 
With respect to these musts, Ameruso "would say, we have to do this one."324 
For example, De Vincenzo's office presented a candidate to DOT along with a 
particular set of duties he was to perform and DOT was required to find a title to fit the 
candidate's qualifications and duties. When DOT could not find a suitable title, an obsolete 
title --- Secretary to the Commissioner --- was resurrected. Although DOT had not considered 
filling the "vacancy" for this title, which had remained vacant since at least 1970, the Mayor's 
Office candidate was hired. When Jean told Commissioner Ameruso he found the appointment 
"ridiculous," he was told it was "one that we had to do."325 
318 Jean at 68; Singer at 95. 
319 Singer at 105-08. 
320 !Q. at 92-94. 
321 !Q. at 96-98, 102-05. 
322 April Tr. at 40; Jean at 70; Singer at 105. 
323 Jean at 70. 
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D. Other Preferences Accorded To 
Mayor's Office Referrals 
A Mayor's Office candidate referred to DOT enjoyed advantages not otherwise 
extended to other job candidates. These advantages began at the time the agency initially 
contacted the candidate, continued through the interview and hiring process and sometimes 
extended through the employee's tenure. 
A Mayor's Office candidate could expect to be contacted more quickly by DOT. 
DOT officials normally contacted candidates by mailing a form letter. However, Mayor's Office 
referrals were often telephoned the same day their names were received. They could then 
expect interviews within a day or two of the initial contact.326 
After they were hired, Mayor's Office referrals were not dismissed without the 
approval of the Mayor's Office. As DeMarco testified, "in theory" DOT could simply dismiss a 
City Hall referral like a non-City Hall referral, "but, in reality, [DOT] probably didn't because 
there was a general aura about the Mayor's Office, and, I think, in general people had a 
concern not to take negative actions unless [there] were extraordinary circumstances."327 And, 
as DeMarco further testified, DOT's reluctance to dismiss Mayor's Office candidates was a 
function of "general concern" about possible "repercussions" from DeVincenzo's office affecting 
the review and approval of DOT's personnel actions.328 
Thus, DOT notified DeVincenzo's office before it terminated a Mayor's Office 
referral.329 At times, DeVincenzo'~ staff would not oppose the employees' termination, but in 
some cases, they would request that the employee be given another chance or moved to 
another bureau.330 Because of the deference accorded to some of these Mayor's Office 
referrals, Singer described them as "like bad pennies" that the agency could not get rid of.331 
Jean recalled one particular, albeit extreme, example: 
326 Singer at 125-26. 
327 April Tr. at 88-89. 
328 J.s!. at 89. 
329 April Tr. at 39, Jean at 89-90; Singer at 42, 43, 121-122. 
330 J.s!. 
331 Singer at 122. 
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There were a few musts. I remember one, and I don't remember 
the man's name, where the guy came in and he was behaving very 
strangely, and my staff in Appointments & Promotions came out 
and said that this guy is not too straight, he was rambling and 
babbling, and I went to the Commissioner and I said, "You know, 
this guy is a problem, but I understood it to be important to City 
Hall that he be put on," and he told me to hold off for a while 
and he would check it out, and at a certain point, he said, "Look, 
we have to find something for him," and we put him in the 
Parking Violations Bureau. 
After about two weeks, I got a call from them that he was very 
disruptive, and I went to the Commissioner again and I said, "This 
guy is very bad, he's, obviously, not all there," and, again I was 
told, at a certain point, that we should give him another chance 
somewhere else, and we put him in Ferries for a while, and I 
think he fell down a ferry hatch, and I don't know what happened 
to him. He was injured. He was on Workmen's Compensation. 
I don't know what happened to him after that.332 





A. Causes Of Patronage Abuses 
The Talent Bank, established for laudable purposes, went awry for a combination 
of reasons. First, it was part of the consolidation of Citywide personnel authority in the 
Mayor's Office, most particularly in one mayoral assistant, Joseph DeVincenzo. By 1983, when 
the Talent Bank was created, DeVin'cenzo had authority over "just about everything that can 
happen to a City employee." DeVincenzo's powers over hires, promotions, transfers and salary 
increases provided him with the means by which he could and did make sure that agencies 
hired candidates referred by political figures, even though the formal hiring authority remained 
with the agencies. 
Second, the consolidation of personnel authority in the Mayor's Office coincided 
with large and steady increases in the number of provisional and discretionary hires. The ability 
of the Mayor's Office to give preferential treatment to candidates referred by political figures 
was obviously severely circumscribed with respect to candidates hired from lists resulting from 
competitive civil service examinations. The increase in the number and percentage of positions 
filled without regard to such lists increased the opportunities for hiring based on political 
considerations. 
Ultimate responsibility for the Talent Bank, however, belongs to the Mayor, who 
created it, publicly announced its creation, and appointed DeVincenzo to run it. By creating 
the Talent Bank and investing it with both an affirmative action and a political mission, the 
Mayor directed that it serve two unequal masters. In retrospect, it can be seen that, given the 
danger that the political objectives of the Talent Bank would overwhelm its affirmative action 
goals, and given the announced importance of the Talent Bank, strong measures were required 
to monitor the situation and act decisively to prevent the abuses which developed. 
The Mayor did not make clear the importance of the Talent Bank's affirmative 
action goals to his aides who ran it or had dealings with it. Jerry Skurnick, for example, 
testified that affirmative action was not one of the Talent Bank's major objectives, and 
DeVincenzo certainly did not take this goal seriously. That DeVincenzo may have been acting 
on his own in giving preferential treatment to candidates on the basis of their political 
sponsorship is beside the point. He was exercising mayoral authority, and his actions 
demonstrated a failure by the Mayor to communicate effectively his views of patronage to the 
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person to whom it was most crucial that he do so. 
Nor did the Mayor take adequate steps to monitor the Talent Bank's 
performance. He did not learn until 1986 that high-paying laborer jobs had been filled 
overwhelmingly by white males referred by political figures and that LoCicero and DeVincenzo 
were soliciting candidates for those jobs from certain county leaders. Brezenoff, however, knew 
these facts by February 1985 at the latest. That Brezenoff did not bring them to the Mayor's 
attention until 1986 indicates that the Mayor had not impressed upon his chief assistant the 
importance of the Talent Bank's affirmative action goal and his disapproval of patron-
age.333 
B. Consequences Of Patronage Abuses 
Patronage inevitably results in serious consequences for integrity in government; 
prominent among them are impaired employee professionalism and morale, decreased 
administrative effectiveness and the distortion of public values by ulterior private influences. 
The patronage practices revealed by the Commission's investigation did yield these results. 
1. Impaired Professionalism And Morale 
The intrusion of political considerations into the personnel practices of DEP and 
DOT had indisputable, if not readily quantifiable, adverse consequences on those agencies ' 
employees. These consequences are decidedly relevant to integrity in government because a 
work force that enjoys a high sense of professionalism and morale is less vulnerable to 
corruption than a work force in which cynicism and insecurity prevail. 
Several members of DEP's personnel staff stated that political connections and 
considerations affected hiring and promotion at that agency. Evidence supporting that 
perception includes the extent to which the Mayor's Office dominated laborer hiring; its efforts 
333 There are other examples of the effect of inadequate communication of policy concerning the Talent Bank and 
patronage. The Talent Bank-related activities of John LoCicero, Skurnick's immediate superior and a political advisor to the Mayor, 
are inconsistent with a clear understanding of the Talent Bank's stated goals. In the solicitation of laborer candidate referrals from 
county leaders, LoCicero failed to take effective steps to ensure that these key sources of candidates referred minority and women 
applicants. (April Tr. at 180-81, 207-08.) Also, the fact that documents reflecting the referral sources of candidates were 
systematically destroyed, and referral source information deleted from the Talent Bank computer, is persuasive evidence that those 
involved in the document destruction at least belatedly understood that there was something wrong with what they had been doing. 
tf the unacceptability of these practices had been communicated unequivocally to them previously, the practices and documents 
would not have existed, and there would have been no occasion for destruction of the records. 
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to push referred candidates; the preferences those candidates were accorded; the rules bent for 
those candidates' benefit; and the chronic delays imposed on personnel actions of DEP by the 
Mayor's Office. 
The chronic delays in hiring staff at DEP, which occurred with a "fair amount of 
regularity,"334 had a particularly significant impact on morale precisely because of the 
widespread perception that these delays were caused by political considerations. As former 
DEP Personnel Director Roger Martin testified: 
The morale impact, I think, was extensive, particularly among the 
upper management personnel. When you, as a city manager, are 
charged with the responsibility of carrying out a mandate of the 
agency and providing service to the public, and you are unable to 
fill your vacancies and staff up to the level at which you can 
complete those responsibilities, your morale has to suffer, because 
you're being called upon to do a job for the citizens of the City, 
and not being given the resources, that is, the personnel in order 
to do that job, and yet you're being held accountable to do the 
job .... 
That's a very heavy morale burden on a manager, not to have the 
resources and staff to be able to accomplish the work that he's 
supposed to accomplish, and if the reason for that is a political 
reason, that's twice as bad.335 
DEP Personnel staffers Cassandra Kennedy and Sherri Roth, and undoubtedly 
many others, were troubled by the preferential treatment that the Mayor's Office referrals 
enjoyed. Kennedy found it frustrating to be unable to help laborer applicants who came "off 
the street" without connections, many of whom were members of minority groups,336 especially 
because those who were being hired were predominantly white males. 
A sense of cynical resignation among at least some DEP employees was another 
result of the intrusion of political considerations into DEP's personnel affairs. Roth testified 
that while most of DEP's administrative staff were aware of and annoyed by this intrusion, 
many simply accepted it as part of "life in the big city."337 
334 Jan. Tr. at 241 . 
335 ]2. at 286-87. 
336 Kennedy at 28. 
337 Jan. Tr. at 263. 
.. 
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At least some DEP employees, however, could not so easily reconcile themselves 
to the extent to which political considerations affected DEP personnel practices. Christopher 
Sullivan, a DEP personnel staff member from January, 1984 to May, 1985, left DEP because he 
became so disaffected by what he described as "unprofessionalism", "bending over backwards to 
City Hall," and "political cronyism" relating to the intrusion of the Mayor's Office into his 
work. 338 He testified, moreover, that he and his colleagues felt that they were unfairly excluded 
from consideration for jobs which went to applicants referred by the Mayor's Office.339 
The morale of DOT employees also suffered. Robert Jean, a former DOT 
Personnel Director, and Marsha Singer both testified that they were concerned with the effects 
on morale when, for example, employees with political connections received large salary 
increases or were hired at disproportionately high salaries. As Jean put it: 
It was difficult on the part of some of my subordinates when they 
saw somebody -- someone who they had signed up and who they 
knew did not sound like someone who was capable or someone 
they dealt with that they knew was incapable, and they would be 
getting a large increase and they would know that through that 
person's connections either politically or personally, that they got 
there. It had a bad effect. 340 
In addition, the perception that some employees enjoyed protection against dismissal because 
they had been referred by the Mayor's Office further damaged morale. 
There was also a sense of resignation at DOT. Jean testified that while he tried 
to hide from lower level staff the fact that politically referred candidates were being hired, 
often at higher salaries than theirs,341 when they did become aware of it he passed on to them 
advice he had received in 1970: 
[W]hen I first came to work for the department, it bothered me, 
and I went --- my boss had to sit me down --- my boss at that 
time was the Personnel Director, Edward Rossomondo, and he 
said to me, you have to learn to deal with this, because the 
338 Sullivan at 5. 
339 
,!2. at 83. 
340 April Tr. at 63. 
341 
,!2. at 49. 
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Mayor does have the right to bring in his own people; and he 
also said that, on a number of occasions --- and I have said that 
to my own people, too, at times --- that you have to make a 
choice. If you feel that these people --- or that you would be 
better off by becoming politically active and referred this way, 
then follow that path, but if you're not, then you have to put up 
with this and do your job and not let it affect you.342 
These are convincing expressions of the impact of political patronage on 
employee morale. As the perception of patronage spreads, it reduces the attractiveness of city 
government service as a· career and can have a negative long-term impact on the quality of 
public service that cannot be measured. The existence of patronage saps incentive for 
meritorious service and diminishes penalties for substandard performance. Career employees 
can become demoralized and cynical about their work. When they are committed to the 
mission of the agency, they see that mission frustrated by political considerations. The cynicism 
may be accompanied by resentment or resignation; in either case, employees' sense of 
professionalism is demeaned because it receives limited reward or recognition. Worse, 
employees see themselves compromised because they are required to participate in the 
patronage practices they find offensive. And, inevitably, their motivation to oppose corruption 
is lessened. 
2. Impaired Economy And Effectiveness 
In Pursuing Public Objectives 
The ability of the Talent Bank, DEP and DOT to serve their functions was also 
directly affected by patronage practices. First, and most obviously, a major objective of the 
Talent Bank, to increase hiring of women and members of minority groups, was seriously 
undermined. As the evidence before the Commission demonstrates, the Talent Bank's chief 
concern from 1983 to 1986 was to facilitate the hiring of candidates with political pedigrees. 
Consequently, the Talent Bank referred for hire lower percentages of minorities and women 
than the City as a whole hired in fiscal years 1983-84, 1984-85 and 1985-86. A particularly 
stark example of the subversion of announced governmental values is presented by the hiring of 
two classes of DOT laborers --- the mostly white assistant highway repairers, deckhands and 
ferry agents and the mostly minority and female debris removers.343 
342 Jean at 103-04. 




City resources were misused: DEP and DOT regularly hired candidates referred 
by the Mayor's Office for positions that the agencies had no current plans to fill. In substance, 
jobs were created for Mayor's Office referrals, regardless of the agencies' actual needs, through 
efforts to find vacancies for which there was budget authority. And legitimate needs were 
altered to suit Mayor's Office referrals. 
At the same time, jobs that the agencies needed to fill were not staffed. DEP 
was often unable to hire needed staff promptly. Laborer vacancies regularly remained unfilled 
because of an insufficient number of Mayor's Office candidates despite the availability of 
qualified, but "unconnected" candidates. Chronic delays in obtaining PAR approvals from the 
Mayor's Office, which DEP staff believed resulted from not "playing ball" with DeVincenzo, 
affected DEP in other ways. As Roth explained: 
When you had a new hire, somebody who perhaps was either not 
working or somebody looking for a new job, and perhaps it was 
delayed because a Talent Bank person hadn't got a job, people 
aren't going to wait four or five months or six months to be hired, 
and we would lose a lot of people by the time we got an actual 
approval that somebody could start. * * * So that's when it would 
really hurt. You would wait for four months, five months, and 
have a vacancy for this amount of time; we finally get the 
approval, the person is gone, you have to start all over again. 344 
Roger Martin also testified to the inevitable consequences these delays had on 
DEP's efficiency: 
You would have programs that wouldn't be put into effect, 
because the staff wasn't brought on in a timely fashion and, 
basically, it gummed up the works, and the agency was less 
efficient. 345 
Pressures from the Mayor's Office, moreover, led DEP and DOT to hire 
candidates on occasion who were at best marginally qualified. And the oversight authority 
wielded by DeVincenzo's office led DOT to retain some Mayor's Office referrals who would 
have otherwise been dismissed. 
344 Roth at 138. 
345 Martin at 64. 
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These, of course, are classic examples of the effects of patronage practices on 
administrative effectiveness. To the extent that they result in the compromising of 
government's legitimate needs, they are also examples of corruption. 
C. Other Consequences Of The Mayor's Office's Practices 
Apart from these consequences, the Commission's investigation uncovered other 
troubling matters. 
First, there was a clear sense that hiring rules and procedures could and should 
be manipulated to satisfy the Mayor's Office. For example, posting requirements for certain 
positions were routinely waived at DOT in order to find jobs for Mayor's Office referrals. At 
DEP, those rating the qualifications of job candidates learned to "fudge" the scores in order to 
resist pressure from the Mayor's Office to hire its referrals. 
Another, potentially more damaging consequence concerns the fear of reprisal 
for cooperation with government investigators. This Commission observed a striking difference 
between the candor and forthrightness of witnesses who were no longer in the City's employ, 
and some of those who were still on the payroll, especially provisional employees. The former, 
on the whole, were much more willing than the latter to recall and describe details of the 
personnel practices they witnessed. Some current employees were explicit in voicing fears of 
retaliation if the fact or substance of their testimony were to come to light. 
In addition, many of those employees directly involved in the execution of the 
patronage practices also participated in the 1986 destruction of documents and were less than 
candid in their sworn testimony concerning both their role in the patronage operation and the 
document destruction. The destruction of documents and the lack of candor are among the 
most serious byproducts of the patronage practices disclosed by the Commission's investigation. 
While they may not be inherent to patronage, they should not come as a surprise. After all, 
patronage employees, and particularly those who are provisional employees, lack job security. If 
there is corrupt behavior, which they might otherwise report or resist, they may be less free to 
do so because it may cost them their jobs. As Robert Jean testified when asked about the 
effect provisional employees had on DOT administration: 
From what I know from what happened in PVB when Jeffrey Lin-
denauer was talking about the hand held computers and they had 
a committee of people reviewing this, most of those people were 
provisional and were beholden --' not necessarily beholden to 
them, but he had a lot of power over a lot of his subordinates 
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that he wouldn't have if they were civil servants and at some 
point, might have felt protected enough to say, no, I'm not going 
to sign this or, I'm not going to do this, but if you're in a position 
where you were vulnerable where you're provisional, or even past 
a certain point as a manager, where someone can tum around and 
when you say, no, I don't think this is right, or, I'm not going to 
sign this, where you can lose your job or be demoted, it's very 
unlikely that you'll say, "No," and in that sense, yes, I think it 
hurts the City.346 




A Patronage Has No Place In Public Personnel Systems. 
The harm that results from patronage extends beyond the individuals whose jobs 
are affected directly and the agencies where it most predominates. Its. presence in even a 
limited way undermines government, for it subordinates the authority of government officials to 
unaccountable political powers. By injecting ulterior and illegitimate influences in place of 
formal standards and procedures, patronage impairs the integrity of government. Involving as it 
does the deploying of public resources to serve private political objectives, patronage, though it 
may not be either unlawful or invidious in intent, is itself a breach of the public trust. It simply 
has no legitimate place in a public personnel system. 
There is a limited place, acknowledged in civil service law, for political 
considerations to play a part in hiring for top-level policy and professional or confidential 
positions, that is, at the Commissioner and perhaps Deputy Commissioner levels. In 
acknowledging the appropriateness of such "political appointments," it is important to define 
clearly what they are and how they differ from patronage hiring. 
In these few, very senior or confidential positions, it is important for an elected 
chief executive to be able to select staff who will share his viewpoint about policy directions, 
who will be accountable to him, serve at his pleasure and wholeheartedly share his agenda. As 
with federal cabinet appointments, political considerations may be relevant, but merit-based 
qualifications are also a sine qua !lQ!!. 347 
Experts consulted by the Commission were unanimous in describing the proper 
role for politically influenced hiring in a public personnel system as a limited one. They 
pointed out that the number of such positions in a municipality like New York City should be 
on the order of a few hundred, not thousands. The entire federal government, with more than 
two million civilian employees, includes only some 3,000 political appointees, and a recent in-
depth study ended with the recommendation that the number be reduced to not more than 
347 Because merit is crucial, and because the reasons for discretionary hiring relate to policy, not just politics, this is not 
patronage. Patronage Is something else. It places politics equal to or above merit, and dictates hiring, salary, promotion and firing 




Despite the concrete adverse effects which accompany patronage, strong 
pressures remain to adopt such practices in government. These pressures are brought to bear 
by political and elected government officials who sometimes expect that the benefits of 
government, including jobs, will be used to reward the supporters of those holding power or to 
appease those who might otherwise be their opponents. Accordingly, they call on government 
decisionmakers to provide such rewards for their support.349 The perceived need of elected 
leaders to build coalitions in order to stay in office or to gain acceptance for their programs 
adds force to these pressures. Where those in elected office view government jobs as in some 
sense "theirs" to award, they themselves become more vulnerable to these pressures from 
without.350 
The chief exe,cutive must meet these inevitable pressures with forceful and 
unequivocal communications of the government's policy that patronage will not be tolerated. 
This communication must go beyond public statements. The chief executive's staff must have 
no doubt about this policy or the consequences that will follow if it is breached. Effective 
internal controls and oversight mechanisms should be in place to detect and correct any 
weakness in this respect. 
B. The Personnel System Must Be Restructured 
To Discourage Patronage Abuses 
The personnel system must be structured so as to protect against the possibility 
of employment decisions based on political ties. Procedures must be put in place to assure 
merit-based, open hiring throughout the system, and that political appointments are restricted to 
those very few positions discussed above. Whenever possible, the day-to-day processes of 
hiring, promoting, disciplining and dismissing public employees should be governed by 
institutionalized procedures and routinely left to the trained professionals in the appropriate 
348 Leadership for America: Rebuilding the Public Service. The Report of the National Commission on Public Service (Volker 
Commission). Washington, O.C., 1989, p. 7. 
. 
349 LoClcero and Brezenoff both testified that county leaders complained that job candidates they referred were not obtaining 
jobs in sufficient numbers. April Tr. at 395-96, 490. 
350 This is one reason that the Commission rejects the argument that •an other things (in terms of merit qualifications) being 
equal," it should be acceptable to prefer the politically referred applicant for a position at any level of government Where political 
considerations for lower and middle level jobs are allowed any play, they open the door to abuse. The way is opened for political 
factors to outweigh merit-based decisions in day-to-day actions of the employee who owes his job to politics. Inequities develop 
in access to employment opportunities; so that the politically connected have an advantage. Other employees, equally meritorious, 
come to feel that without a political sponsor their chances of advancement are inferior. 
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agencies, namely, the Department of Personnel and the personnel departments within mayoral 
agencies. While there must be effective oversight mechanisms in place, to assure that what is 
expected is what is done, staff within the Mayor's Office should not be charged with case-by-
case review of personnel actions. Nor should those oversight procedures be controlled, on a 
day-to-day basis, by the same individual or group of individuals that controls the recruiting and 
hiring process. The Mayor, of course, should retain the power, indeed responsibility, to dictate 
overall policy objectives to Commissioners of all agencies, including the Department of 
Personnel, and the authority to require that specific steps be taken to attain those objectives.351 
Specifically, the Commission recommends the following steps: 
1. Staff within the Mayor's Office should have no role in 
· individual day-to-day personnel decisions, such as Planned Action 
Report ("PAR") and Managerial Position Description ("MPD") 
review procedures. 
2. A separate Appointments Office should be established for 
senior, policy-level positions. 
3. Firm requirements should be adopted for providing widespread 
notice of employment opportunities. In addition to posting, 
advertising in newspapers of general circulation should be 
required. Posting and advertising should be required by law, not 
by a waivable mayoral directive. 
4. Where the threshold requirements of certain jobs make it 
likely that large numbers of people can qualify and traditional 
screening procedures might be inequitable, other procedures such 
as lotteries should be used to ensure that the opportunities for 
such jobs are fairly distributed. 
5. The percentage of provisional employees in the City personnel 
system should be drastically reduced. If overhaul of the civil 
service procedures is required to accomplish this, a commission 
should be empaneled to study and recommend effective changes. 
351 These might include, for example, d!rectives to fill vacancies only in cases of urgent necessity; to authorize appointments 
only after reviewing evidence of an affirmative action search; to encourage speedy appointment of environmental protection 
inspectors needed for a new program, and the likQ. 
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·-1. The Mayor's Office Should Not Have A Day-To-Day 
Role In Personnel Decisions 
As discussed above, the consolidation of the power to refer job candidates to 
agencies and the power to review agency personnel actions in the Mayor's Office unit under 
Joseph DeVincenzo was the crucial factor in the patronage practices disclosed by the 
Commission's investigation. DeVincenzo's authority over the PAR and the MPD process 
provided the muscle by which politically referred candidates were leveraged into DEP and 
DOT. The testimony of DEP and DOT witnesses vividly demonstrates that they "played ball" 
with DeVincenzo precisely because he exercised such extensive authority over their personnel 
actions. 
Staff within the Mayor's Office should not be directly involved in the oversight 
of routine personnel decisions. They should be handled by the Department of Personnel, in 
conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget, which are responsible for establishing 
personnel procedures and reviewing personnel decisions.352 Within that framework of 
oversight, appropriate control over hiring and firing should be delegated to the operating 
agencies. 
Removing day-to-day oversight responsibility from staff within the Mayor's Office 
itself would not unduly impair the Mayor's ability to make sure that the personnel system is 
well run, that its leaders follow his agenda or that they are accountable for its performance. To 
the contrary, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners in the Department of Personnel, as 
well as in the Office of Management and Budget, are directly accountable to the Mayor for the 
effective performance of their duties, and the policies and practices they are to implement could 
be dictated by the Mayor. The current practice, which involves staff within the Mayor's Office 
in a second layer of detailed review, serves no essential purpose (and, in fact, is cumbersome 
and counterproductive to effective management) but makes much more likely exactly what 
happened in this case: the introduction of political considerations into personnel practices. 
2. A Separate Appointments Office 
Should Be Established 
The Mayor's Office should have direct authority over only the small number of 
senim employees and other narrowly defined confidential employees for whom direct 
accountability to the Mayor is important for reasons of policy. A separate office, removed from 
352 It would be appropriate, for example, to establish an internal control system within the Department of Personnel and 
individual agencies to monitor compliance with prescribed personnel procedures. 
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the rest of the civil service and personnel system, should handle those few appointments.353 
Consideration should be given to the establishment of a screening panel, similar 
to the Abrams panel, 354 to evaluate the merit qualifications of potential policy-level appointees. 
In any event, to the extent that political considerations are involved in these appointments they 
should be clear, public and open. 
3. Widespread Notice Of All Vacancies 
Should Be Required By Law 
The Mayoral Directive requiring posting of all job vacancies was waived or 
ignored regularly, particularly when DOT and DEP were hiring large numbers of employees for 
relatively unskilled jobs; in other words, precisely in the kind of hiring where posting was 
especially important to the goal of attracting a wide pool of qualified candidates. Since posting 
procedures were required by the Mayor's Office, DEP and DOT personnel staff viewed posting 
as a requirement the Mayor's Office could waive. But waivers of this kind simply enhance the 
possibility that patronage practices will exist and serve to narrow the availability of applicants 
and reduce desirable competition for jobs. 
Posting and advertising are fundamental to an open and equitable public hiring 
system. Requirements for posting of vacancies, and even wider notification of the availability of 
positions for which there are or may be large numbers of vacancies, should be rigorously 
· enforced, and certainly not relegated to a position that "he who gives can take away." The 
requirements should be clear and unequivocal, and should have the force of law.355 
353 Some have recommended that the Mayor's Office be allowed to participate in recruiting and referral of City employees, 
so long as it does not also have responsibility for routine oversight review of personnel actions. Others oppose such a role for 
the Mayor's Office, since this, itself, would create the risk of politicizing those decisions. 
The Commission opposes a system which involves the Mayor's Office in receiving political referrals of the names of 
candidates for government employment As a practical matter, once the notion of political referrals for City jobs has been given 
an institutional blessing (as by creating an office through which such referrals are processed) the way is that much more clear 
for it to be abused, for 'all other things' not to be so equal, and for those within and outside the system to believe that they are 
not. 
354 Under present practice, the Mayor's Committee on Appointments, chaired by Floyd Abrams, submits recommendations 
to the Mayor from which the Mayor appoints members of nine commissions and boards, subject to confirmation by the City 
Council. 
355 If there are circumstances which might warrant departure from the requirement, the possible range of circumstances 
should be statutorily prescribed and a procedure should be established to ensure that exceptions are made rarely, for documented 
reasons, as authorized by appropriate reviewing personnel, and are open to public scrutiny. 
-. 
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4. Open And Equitable Selection Procedures ·-
Should Be Adopted For All Positions 
There are potentially a significant number of positions for which traditional 
testing methods may not be suitable screening devices. Among these are possibly a number of 
jobs, such as laborer jobs, for which there may be minimum qualification requirements, yet 
which command relatively high salaries, and thus would be attractive to a large number of 
applicants.356 In these situations, alternative procedures must be developed, to ensure that 
these positions are available on an open and equitable basis, and selections among those 
qualified are made in a fair way. The lottery procedure adopted by the Talent Bank in recent 
years seems one viable alternative. ·Certainly others can also be developed. The standard must 
always be that the procedures be open and available on an equitable basis to all who qualify.357 
5. The Percentage Of Provisional 
Employees Must Be Drastically Reduced 
One of the critical tasks of the Department of Personnel must be to reduce the 
percentage of provisional employees and other discretionary hiring in the City personnel system. 
The number and percentage of provisional employees in New York City government today are 
shockingly high and increasing annually. 
There are currently more than 30,000 provisional employees (over 20%) in the 
work force in the mayoral agencies alone.358 In addition, there are over 2,000 employees in 
positions to which they were provisionally promoted, nearly 12,000 employees in non-
competitive positions, and over 750 employees in exempt classifications. Thus, more than 30% 
of the City's work force are in discretionary positions in their current jobs. In 1978, only 3% of 
the work force held provisional positions, and only 10% were in discretionary positions.359 
356 During the time period covered by this investigation, certain laborer positions for which there had been competitive 
testing requirements were reclassified by the State Civil Service Commission, at the City's request, into non-competitive Laborer 
Class titles. The Commission cannot and does not comment on the appropriateness of particular classifications. The crucial 
requirement is that all positions, whether competitive class or laborer class, be openly and equitably available to those who qualify. 
357 Other positions may also be difficult to test for in the traditional manner historically used in civil service systems. In 
all these cases, the principle remains the same: selection procedures must be devised which will make these positions available 
on an equitable basis to those who would be qualified to perform the work. 
358 This excludes the Transit Authority, the Department of Education, the Health and Hospitals Corporation, and the non-
pedagogical component of the City University system, as well as other agencies with fewer employees. 
359 See Attachment 0 . 
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The experts consulted by the Commission have unanimously described these 
figures as "shocking," "astonishing," "alarm bells." One has said they represent the "demise of 
the civil service system." It has been said that these figures cannot be appropriate within the 
terms of the Civil Service Law and rules, particularly the provision of state law which provides 
that employees hired provisionally cannot remain for more than nine months without going 
through civil service procedures.360 
This high percentage of provisional employees has important implications for 
integrity in government, some of which are reflected in the circumstances of this case. For 
example, provisional employees are, by defi~ition, very vulnerable.361 To quote one expert, 
"there is no such thing as a 'provisional whistleblower.'" Also, an environment so full of 
discretionary hiring lends itself readily to patronage abuse, particularly when no safeguards exist 
to prevent that from happening. 
The civil service system faces enormous pressures, and the recent growth in the 
number of provisionals stems from several causes.362 Other jurisdictions, however, have ex-
perienced similar pressures, have devoted considerable resources to study and reform of their 
merit-based public employment systems, and have developed techniques which show much 
promise. This Commission has not undertaken such a study. But the portion of New York 
City's hiring and personnel practices the Commission has examined in depth dramatically 
highlights today's problems, and points the direction for what remains to be done. 
The New York City civil service system is in a state of crisis. Anecdotal 
evidence related by experts, and confirmed by a number of Commission staff interviews, suggest 
that the Civil Service Law is now widely regarded as something it is desirable to bypass or 
. avoid, where possible. Adherence to the law is viewed as hampering the effective recruitment, 
deployment, and retention of qualified workers. The expression "civil service mentality" is a 
pejorative description of a bureaucrat who mindlessly follows rules and cannot get anything 
done. 
360 New York Civil Service Law§ 65.2. The New York State Civil Service Commission, which oversees the City system, has 
not audited the City since before 1978. Commission on Government Integrity staff were told it would require all the audit resources 
of the entire State Commission for over a year, to perform such an audit. 
361 Although the most recent City union contracts provide for some job security for employees who have been provisional 
hires for more than two years in the same title (itseH a recognition of serious problems of compliance with the letter of the civil 
service laws), these safeguards do not apply to managerial employees. 
362 For example, intense pressures both from lawsuits over the unequal impact of the tests used in public hiring, and from 
the vastly increased demands placed on City employees to deliver complex services, have hindered the City's ability to recruit 
employees in the manner it did years ago. .. 
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Clearly, more is needed than just effective enforl:ement of current law; more is 
needed than even a dedicated audit by the State Civil Service Commission could provide. One 
high-level employee described what is needed as a "Moreland Act Commission focusing solely 
on the civil service/personnel issues."363 There are skills, talents and experience in the private 
sector, and in other jurisdictions. All should be enlisted for a comprehensive attack on the 
problem. 
Dated: New York, New York 
August 1989 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY 
John D. Feerick 
Chairman 
Richard D. Emery 
Patricia M Hynes 
James L. Magavem 
Bernard S. Meyer 
Bishop Emerson J. Moore 
Cyrus R Vance 
363 Since mid-century, the New York City public personnel system has been the repeated subject of detailed expert study 
and comprehensive reform~. Mayor's Committee on Management Survey (1952) ; Josephs Commission on Government of New 







Little more than a month after the Commission's January 1989 public hearings at 
which DeVincenzo testified, he retired from City service at age 46. Prior to his retirement, 
DeVincenzo took a number of steps --- consistent with current law --- which had the effect of 
locking in his eligibility for a $52,000 annual pension before any pending investigation of his 
conduct could be concluded. 
The Commission has previously examined the subject of pension forfeiture for 
public employees engaged in wrongdoing.1 DeVincenzo's ability to retire before any action 
could be taken which might have jeopardized his lucrative pension prompted the Commission to 
explore the details of DeVincenzo's retirement as an illustration of the operation of the current 
pension law in the absence of a forfeiture provision. 
B. Navigating The Shoals Of 
The New York City Retirement System 
1. DeVincenzo's Dealings With The Retirement System 
By dint of his authority, DeVincenzo was able to command the personal 
attention of the senior staff of the New York City Employees' Retirement System ("NYCERS"). 
Virtually every step of the processing of DeVincenzo's retirement papers was preceded by 
extensive consultation with retirement system officials designed to maximize the chances that his 
retirement plans would not be made known to his employer, the Mayor, or to the New York 
City Department of Investigation ("DOI") and to minimize the likelihood that disciplinary action 
could be taken against him before he retired. 2 
Early one morning in January 1989, DeVincenzo met Harold Herkommer, the 
1 The Commission's recommendations for pension forfeiture legislation are set forth in its report, 'Crime Shouldn't Pay: A 
Pension Forfeiture Statute for New York' (May 1988). 
2 Under the applicable retirement law of New York State, a public employee who perfects his retirement application and 
retires before any disciplinary action is taken, is entitled to receive a pension, whether or not he or she is subsequently convicted 
of a crime. 
-. 
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executive director of NYCERS, at the corner of West Broadway and Chambers Street. This 
meeting had been arranged at DeVincenzo's request, on the theory that it would be imprudent 
for him to be seen at Herkommer's office at 220 Church Street.3 
From the corner, they walked to a nearby diner. There, DeVincenzo posed 
certain questions: Who would be notified of his retirement? When would his retirement 
become effective? How does NYCERS count the 30-day minimum waiting period between the 
time an application to retire is first filed and an employee's earliest effective retirement date?4 
The last question, in particular, was one to which DeVincenzo returned over and 
over again in the course of the next several weeks. Under the rules of the Uniformed 
Sanitation Force retirement plan for which DeVincenzo was eligible, a retiring employee must 
provide the City with a minimum of 30 days notice before his retirement can become effective. 
According to the retirement system's rules, the employee who puts in for retirement in 30 days 
must still be on the City payroll on the 29th day of the waiting period in order to collect his 
pension.5 If at any point prior to the 30th day, the employee is discharged, he loses his right 
to a pension altogether. If he is demoted and his salary reduced, his pension is proportionally 
diminished, since the lion's share is based on the employee's salary on his last day of service.6 
Herkommer estimated that he had at least half a dozen discussions with 
DeVincenzo or his aides in January and February 1989 about how the 30-day minimum waiting 
period was to be reckoned and what would be his earliest retirement date.7 Not once did 
DeVincenzo personally appear at NYCERS' office. When he wanted to speak with 
Herkommer, he arranged to meet him out of the office, or called him at home or from a pay 
3 April Tr. at 279-81. As Herkommer stated in private testimony to the Commission, 'If a Commissioner walks into my office, 
all the phones start ringing that day, and the next thing, the Mayor is told, you know, hey, so and so is leaving you.• Herkommer 
at 24. 
4 April Tr. at 281-82; Herkommer at 46-47. 
5 See Rule 25 of the New York City Employees' Retirement System: 
(emphasis added.) 
Except as otherwise provided within these rules, service retirement and ordinary disability 
retirement shall take effect on a date not less than thirty days nor more than ninety days 
after the date of filing of application for retirement with the Board of Trustees while in city-
service, provided that as to service retirement, applicant was also in city-service on the day 
prior to the effective retirement date. 
6 April Tr. at 299-300. 
7 !Q. at 300-01. 
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phone. Aides delivered and retrieved the necessary retirement papers. 
On Friday, January 20, 1989, Jean Ross, DeVincenzo's secretary and 
administrative assistant, appeared at NYCERS' office with DeVincenzo's retirement application. 
Both Herkommer and NYCERS' deputy executive director had left for the day. In their 
absence, DeVincenzo's retirement application was rejected by the supervisor of NYCERS' 
Information Room because the application was unsigned and the space where the retirement 
date was to be filled in had been left blank. 8 
Ross reached Herkommer at home by telephone from NYCERS and informed 
him of the difficulties she was having with the processing of DeVincenzo's retirement papers. 
After briefly discussing the possibility of taking the papers back to De Vincenzo for his signature 
and then returning to NYCERS that day, they decided that an aide would bring the papers in 
on Monday, January 23.9 Herkommer assured Ross that he would be in his office, as usual, at 
7:30 a.m. to receive DeVincenzo's retirement papers personally. 
On Monday, January 23, 1989,10 Herkommer arrived at the office shortly before 
8 a.m. to find that Robert Valenotti, an aide in DeVincenzo's office, had already called to 
check if Herkommer was in. Minutes later, Valenotti appeared and delivered DeVincenzo's 
retirement application.11 The effective retirement date chosen by DeVincenzo was 90 days 
8 12· at 287-90. 
9 April Tr. at 289. These arrangements were confirmed over the weekend of January 21 and 22 in the course of several 
additional telephone calls to Herkommer's home from DeVincenzo and Ross. 12· at 290-91. 
10 Herkommer testified that after he received DeVincenzo's retirement application on January 23, he handed it to his deputy, 
Sara Tufano, and instructed her to deliver it to the Information Room, from which, in the normal course of events, it would have 
been picked up by an internal messenger on one of several daily mail runs and taken to the mail room to be clocked in. Herkom-
mer at 143-49. 
Herkommer was at a loss to explain how DeVincenzo'e retirement application, which he testified he received early in the 
morning of Monday, January 23, 1989, was not clocked into NYCERS until 11:15 a.m. on January 24. (Herkommer at 138-49.) 
NYCERS prides itself on avoiding this kind of discrepancy, since, as Herkommer explained: 
"[Tlhe most Important thing at the Retirement System is the clock-in date. Beneficiaries are 
designated on death beds. Five minutes make a difference between a benefit of a quarter 
of a million dollars. We live and breathe clock-in days." 
Herkommer at 138-39. 
Herkommer testified that. at his request, his staff checked a sampling of other documents filed at NYCERS on January 
23, 1989 and found that they were all clocked in on January 23. The discrepancy in DeVincenzo's case could therefore not be 
attributed to a failure in the clock-in mechanism. Herkommer at 147; April Tr. at 293-94. 
11 April Tr. at 286, 291-92. 
-. 
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hence --- April 23, 1989.12 
·-
DeVincenzo did not, however, wait until April 23 to retire. At midday on 
Tuesday, February 21, 1989, Ross and Valenotti again appeared at the NYCERS office. They 
brought with them an Affidavit to Change Retirement Date, signed by DeVincenzo, which 
accelerated his retirement date from April 23 to February 22, 1989.13 However, DeVincenzo's 
aides had no intention of filing his affidavit to change the retirement date as early as noon on 
the 21st. Rather, they wanted Herkommer's deputies, John Murphy and Sara Tufano, to review 
the affidavit to make sure that it was properly filled out. Having been assured that the form 
was correctly filled out, Ross and Valenotti left the office without filing it.14 
Later that same day, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Ross returned alone. She 
brought with her the affidavit that Murphy and Tufano had checked for her earlier that day 
and handed it to Murphy, who walked it down to the mail room to time stamp it.15 
The events of February 21, 1989 had been carefully choreographed by 
De Vincenzo and his aides well before that day. Herkommer recalls having a series of 
conversations with Ross spanning a three-day period prior to February 15 to go over the 
calculation of the 30-day waiting period and to confirm that February 22, 1989 would be the 
earliest effective date on which DeVincenzo could retire.16 
Discussions between DeVincenzo and NYCERS during the week of February 13 
were not limited to the question of the earliest date that De Vincenzo would be eligible for 
retirement. There was also an extended discussion of when the last possible moment was that 
12 There is some evidence that, despite the fact that DeVincenzo initially designated a retirement date 90 days away, he 
intended from the outset to retire in 30 days. Herkommer recalls that prior to January 23, he had discussions with DeVincenzo 
about how to count the 30-day waiting period and about changing the retirement date between the 90th and the 30th day. In this 
regard, Herkommer recalls telling DeVincenzo that he did not need the approval of his employer to make that kind of change. 
Herkommer at 8. 
13 Murphy at 68-69; April Exhibit 50. Herkommer had previously provided the Affidavit to Change Retirement Date to 
DeVincenzo on February 15, 1989. On that date, he and DeVincenzo had a second meeting at a diner in the vicinity of NYCERS; 
the purpose of the meeting, as Herkommer recalled it, was for DeVincenzo to supply the papers necessary to document his date 
of birth. 
Herkommer recalled walking back from the diner toward his building and inviting DeVincenzo up to his office to tile his birth 
certificate papers. DeVincenzo declined. Herkommer recalls taking the birth certificate papers up to his office and then going back 
down to meet DeVincenzo in the lobby to hand him the Affidavit to Change Retirement Date. April Tr. at 304-07. 
14 Murphy at 69-71. 
15 !2· at 75-76. 
16 April Tr. at 301-04, 307-08. 
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DeVincenzo could file the papers necessary to change his retirement date to February 22.17 
Specifically, DeVincenzo wanted to know how close to the end of the day on February 21 he 
could file the change.18 
Herkommer discussed this issue with his staff and they advised DeVincenzo's 
staff to try to file the affidavit before 5 p.m. on February 21.19 DeVincenzo followed that 
advice punctiliously: his affidavit to change retirement date from April 23, 1989 to February 22, 
1989 was clocked in at 4:59 p.m. on February 21, 1989.20 
2 The Missing Notice To DOI 
One of the concerns DeVincenzo voiced at an early meeting with Herkommer in 
January 1989 was who would be notified of his retirement. Herkommer told him that DOI was 
the only agency to be notified. De Vincenzo pressed him, asking how long it would take for 
DOI to receive notice. Herkommer told him that notice to DOI typically goes out three to 
eight days after the retirement application is filed.21 
It was NYCERS' normal practice in January 1989 to send to DOI, on a periodic 
basis, printouts of the names of all employees who filed for retirement. These printouts were 
generated by NYCERS and hand-delivered to DOI by the City's Central Messenger Service.22 
A log maintained by NYCERS suggests that the printout for retirement 
applications clocked in on January 24, 1989, the date DeVincenzo's application was clocked in, 
was sent to DOI on January 31, 1989, along with printouts for retirement applications received 
on January 25, January 26 and January 27. However, DOI is missing not only the January 24 
printout and the other three printouts which, according to NYCERS' log, were sent to DOI on 
January 31, but is also missing a subsequent batch of printouts which NYCERS' log indicates 
17 Murphy at 54-55. 
18 !Q. at 72-75; April Tr. at 309-10. 
19 Murphy at 72-75. 
20 April Exhibit 50. 
21 April Tr. at 282, 285-86. 
22 !Q. at 294-95. 
.. 
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were sent on February 6, 1989.23 As of February, no particular person at DOI was responsible 
for making sure that a printout was received from NYCERS for each working day.24 
3. Belated Notice To The Mayor's Office 
In January 1989, NYCERS changed its practice of notice to and approval by the 
employing agency of an employee's expression of intent to change retirement dates. Prior to 
January 1989, it was NYCERS' normal practice to notify the employing agency and to seek the 
employing agency's approval in the event that an employee wanted --- as DeVincenzo did --- to 
change his retirement date. 
This practice --- which was in effect for as long as anyone at NYCERS can 
remember --- was changed in late December .1988 or early January 1989. Without consulting 
his Board of Trustees, Herkommer abolished the requirement that the employing agency 
approve an employee's proposed change of retirement date.25 Had DeVincenw, for instance, 
filed his retirement papers in November 1988 and sought to advance his retirement date in 
December, a letter would have been sent to the Mayor advising him of the change of 
retirement date and requesting the Mayor's approval. Because that practice was abolished just 
weeks before DeVincenzo filed for retirement, the only notice sent to the Mayor's Office was 
sent after his retirement was a fait accompli.26 
Thus, on February 17, 1989, when Deputy Mayor Brezenoff and Chief of Staff 
Diane Coffey met with DeVincenzo to tell him that the Mayor had concluded that he should 
resign, DeVincenw surprised them by telling them that he had already put in his retirement 
papers, effective in 90 days.27 
23 DOI also determined that it is missing printouts for over 80 working days in the preceding year. 
24 In the wake of DeVincenzo's retirement, DOI and NYCERS have modified their procedures for transmitting and receiving 
the printouts. NYCERS now sends the printouts to DOI by fax machine instead of by messenger; if, for some reason, on a given 
day no printout is sent, NYCERS faxes a message to DOI to advise them that no printout is being sent that day. (Herkommer at 
203-04.) A DOI employee is responsible for calling NYCERS if nothing is received. 
25 April Tr. at 312·18. Herkommer testified that he changed the policy on -agency approval for applications to change a 
retirement date so as to effect consistency with a different rule change, approved by NYCERS' Board of Trustees on December 
21, 1988, eliminating the requirement that the employing agency be notified and its approval sought when an employee seeks 
to witMraw his retirement application. !.Q. at 317·18; Herkommer at 8-18, 55-69. 
26 April Tr. at 282-83, 315, and April Exhibit 51. 
27 Thia was not the first time that DeVincenzo had spoken to Brezenoff about the possibility of retiring. Either immediately 
before or immediately after DeVincenzo testified at the Commission's public hearings on January 11, 1989, he asked Brezenoff 
whether the Mayor wanted him to resign. Brezenoff responded that the Mayor had not indicated any such desire. During that 
conversation, DeVincenzo gave Brezenoff to understand that while he had no immediate plans to retire, if he were to do so 'it 
(continued ... ) 
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Stunned, Brezenoff pressed De Vincenzo to tell him when he had done so. 
According to Brezenoff, DeVincenzo could not remember the date. At first, he told Brezenoff 
he had put in his retirement papers "a week or so ago." When Brezenoff pressed him further, 
DeVincenzo had to look through his papers to find the date.28 Brezenoff told DeVincenzo 
that the Mayor wanted him to leave by the end of March;29 DeVincenzo said that he would 
have to think it over.30 
The facts outlined above strongly suggest that by February 17, when Brezenoff 
asked for DeVincenzo's resignation, DeVincenzo had already effectively mapped out his strategy 
for retiring without the loss of his pension. By February 17, he had already secured from 
NYCERS not only the papers necessary to advance his retirement date, but had worked out in 
detail the precise date and time he would make that change. Although he sought Brezenoff s 
assurances on February 17 that the Mayor had no immediate plans to fire him,31 DeVincenzo 
took no chances. To Brezenoff s surprise, De Vincenzo informed him on February 23 that he 
had taken himself off the payroll the previous day.32 
C. Conclusion And Recommendation 
In April 1988, the Commission recommended that state law be changed to 
permit the forfeiture of pension rights of public employees convicted of a felony related to their 
employment. If such forfeiture was permitted, it would occur upon conviction. The timing of 
the filing of the employee's retirement papers would not be relevant to the forfeiture 
determination. 
In the absence of such a change in the law, the current New York City system 
'renders critical the timing of the retirement notice and the employee's choice of an effective 
retirement date. In theory, the current system is designed to allow the City to determine, prior 
27 ( ... continued) 
would be three, four months into the future.' April Tr. at 504-05. 
28 April Tr. at 511-12. 
29 12· at 510-13, 582. 
30 12· at 582. 
31 12· at 513. 
32 12· at 516-17. 
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to the employee's retirement date, whether wrongdoing has <!>CCurred sufficient to discharge or 
demote an employee, and thereby affect his pension. In practice, as DeVincenzo's maneuvers 
demonstrate, that system is seriously flawed. In the absence of the recommended changes in 
the state law, the Commission concludes that it is imperative that the City system be changed to 
condition a public employee's pension on the employee providing written notice of intent to 
retire at least ninety days in advance of the proposed retirement date to the employee's agency 
head and to DOI. In addition, the City should provide that the designated retirement date may 
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?a:-~-ti::ie c=J Woulc :ull-ti::le be 
l3 • ~·1eekencs? 
Are:.s of Ex::::e!:"-::ise · 
... 
~ 
o re d. t·-y G-i~ r/t r1 I-J 
t~'? :...r:g' ~:-1:1cessing, et:c.) 
' 
.. . - ;: .. ·~~ 
... ; . ~;,,~,._;,:>./:~? : . ~~ 
(s;::eci.:y) 









9. AC.dt.1 1 Phone No. 
..,. 
-------------------r-----~---------------------------------------------------~ 




:;~~ .. : 
~~~·~·~6~--~~ · · . .. ·-··.- -·- ·· 
OFFICE OF THE M..~YOR 
... \. RESUME COVER SHEET 
, :::ffe:JL ~~ Re:::::l--'-S-o_u_r_c_e __ ~~·--_ <?_=-_~~~---- Date Rec ' d 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Titles Areas of Expertise 
Principal Admin. ~sociate (adrnin.-03; statistics-32) 
-
1 E, "'' - "'\ _.DO'\. 2. Minimum Sa ary ~ ~ vv~ 
3 . Special Skills (foreign language, typing, word processing, etc.) 
~u.~ l}J· ~~ 
3a. Driver's · License? ~O 
-----
4. Post Graduate Degrees 
----------~ 
(specify) 
-···-------. •-w -rr~,._, . .. .. ...,..... .. ~-•· ••.. ,, Jl- ••J•• ... ":'---.t.-.... • ,,.,,, -··~-...;;;,~'; ..,.:.~-......,.- . .... ... ... - .. ~ • ... .; .. ~~ ..... •· • ; • ~· - ·. •• 








Part-time c=J Would full-time be considered? CJ / 
7. Shift Hork? 8. Weekends? 9. Addt' 1 Phone No. 
--------- ---------r--------.-----------------------;,.;--------------------




OFFICE OF THE M.~YOR 
RESUME COVER SHEET Nam4-&~KJ-Uf Mkfimn~.eferral So~rce' l ~ Date Rec'd ·$ _,....__ __ _ 
Ethnicity lV sex F Phone C:21d-)_·-__ _ 
-------------------------------------------~=---------------------------------~~ 
1. Titles Areas of Exnertise 
.1 
Principal Admin. Asscciate (aaministrative-03) 
2. Hinimu::t Salary 12c,CJC .. .lQ 
3. S9ecial Skills (foreign language, typing, word processing, etc.) 
-
3a. Driver's License? ~ t:;') 
I 
4. Post Graduate Degrees (specify) 
5. Acce!;Jtable Work Locations }JO s:r. I) ()f-£~--\?' .q..Q(1ttNs6. Shift Work? 
yes yes 
or or 
no ·· no 




c:::=J Would full-time be considered? CJ 
a. 9. Weekends? 'it?~ 10. Addt' 1 Phone No. -
-----------------------------------------------------------
. . . 
D!\TE 
' 1 




~ ... .. : . . -~---- · . 





;;J.F/ ( . 
.. 
Date or Review ... , ... , 
OFFICE OF THE M.~YOR 
.. RESUME COVER SHEET Name/)od~ Referral Source d'§ &MJ -. Date Rec'd 
Ethnicity Sex M Phone (l.U-d._. ( 
-------------------------------------~------=-------------------------- ---
1. Titles 
Principal Admin. Associate 
Assistant Project Coord. 
Staff Analyst 
2. Minimum Salary 
Areas of Exoertise 
( administrative-03; contracts-11; 
analyst-04) 
3. Special Skills (foreign language, typing, word processing, etc.) 
-\ 
3a. Driver's License? ye-5 
4; ~ost Graduate Degrees (specify) 












Part-time c=Jwould full-time be conside~ed? . c:::=J 
7. Shift tlork? \\0 8. ~'leekends? NO 9. Addt 1 l Phone No. 
-------------------------------------------------------- ----------------
DATE Jl.GENCY TITLE DIS?OSITIOt-! 
-




. . . . . 
Date of Review 
OFFICE OF THE M..~YOR -----
RESUME COVER SHEET 
Referral Source ::J1J G" JJ. Date Rec'd 
---------
Ethnicity · H Sex fV\ · Phone 
-rl~:::~~~;:. · ; . 
- . 
·-..-·-------------------------------------------------------------------------- , ·::~: ~:~:.:· . . .. ·- .;: _. · : l:~;j~e~teS . Areas of Exnertise ~ y~:\'r , 
. ;it~.~~ ~.s"~s~/ ri~ · 
. . ·:;" ::~ .C,,v~. -~~ 
· .. ·· · ·~.s~·~ -~ ..... 
... ,. .· 
fl 
2. Minimwn Salary veJ I JU 
JU U ~I u;-·· .51! 
CAJN n--
3. Special Skills (foreign language, typing, word processing, etc.) 
.. 
.. -~ . 
3a. Drivers License? 
4 . Post Gr~~uate Degrees - · . . _____ .._ ___ (specify) 
. __;_':Z..- • -;~..,__ ... , ..... ·1·· ,-.·. - -· .. --: . . . "'-:- ··-. - ... :· .. ' . ... :.. .... . ,.. .. 
5. Acceptable Work Loca~ions 
yes yes 
. . or or 
no no 




Part-time c=Jwould full-time be -considered? c==J 
I 
4 
7 •· Shift Hork? 8. Weekends? 9. Addt'l -Phone No. 
.z 
.·: ·'. ·•·. 
·.:: .... 
·.: . . 
~ . . . 
. . . -------------------1---------.------------------------------------------------
DATE AGENCY - . TITLE DISPOSITIOr-! - · 
~f :j5'1. l)c?P ~Nc11-~~ ~ <LCB ~c1 
. I I I '~. 
I I I 
., I I 
ATTACHMENT 
._, . 





Date of Review '+/ io1 e 
OFFICE OF THE ~L~YOR 
RESUME COVER SHEET 
·-
Name '7Ae. f/frnA- l.Jr;;/rU f2/1.,, Ref err al Source .LA Po ~-r. e / J/2. · Date Rec'd 3//b/ 
Ethnicity · f,,.,j Sex Phone 
· ------------------------------------------~-----------------------------
1. Titles Areas of Exoertise 
Nurse's Aide ) 
Office Associate 
Shop Clerk 
2. Minimum Salary 
3. Special Skills {foreign language, typing, word processing, etc : ) 
~ Q: ~ L00'ic\.s 
3a. Driver's License? ~ 
4. Post Graduate Degrees {specify) 
5. Acceptable Work Locations ClU(lllU'='f,0. ~o.Q~p. ,R_ j 
yes yes 
or . or 
no no 
. 6. • Full-time IQ<-4 Would part-time be considered? ~ 
y s yes 
or or 
no no 
Part-time c=Jwould full-time be considered? r==J 
7. Sh~ft Hork? ~ 8 . Weekends? ~ 9. Addt'l Phone No. 
·-------1------------------------- -------- ------------------------











: MINORITY HIRES 
CITYWIDE . CITYWIDE DISCRETIONARY · TALENT BANK 
Fiscal Year* Citvwide Citywide Discretiona~ Talent Bank 
.. 
1983-84 5,796 49.28% 2,633 48.72% 145 39.51 % 
1984-85 8,362 52.84% 5,026 51.64% 238 50.32% 
1985-86 8,117 54.60% 5,090 54.32% 208 51.23% 
1986-87 6,850 56.24% ** 4 532 
' 
58.52% 334 68.30% 
Total 1983-87 29,125 53.31 % 17,281 53.58% 925 53.31 % 
1983-8"4 198-1-85 1985-86 1986-87 
FISCAL YEAR "' 
., 
-. 
"CfTYV,1DE. TAL.E:--1 DA.'iK. FISCAL YEAR E..'iDl!'G DATE. JU!'E 30. 
C:T\-V.lDE DISCR£110:-iARY. FISCAL YEAR E.'iDl!'G DATE. Ai'RJL 30. 
•• C:TYV.lDE DISCRETIO!'AR Y FIGURES: ).IA Y l~ · FEBRUARY l?o!7. ATTACHMENT 
F 
.. ~ FEMALE HIRES 
CITYWIDE · CITYWIDE DISCRETIONARY . TALENT BANK 
·· .. · .. 
,· . 
. 


















4,046 34.40% 2,488 46.04% 
5,518 34.87% 4,412 . 45.33% 
5,730 38.54% 4,357 46.50% 
5,035 41.34% ** 3 923 
' 
50.65% 
20,329 37.21 % 15,180 47.07% 
5~~--------------------------~ 
2~1------------------------~---J 
1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 
FISCAL YEAR " 
-. 
• CITY\l.10E. TALE.ST OA.'il;. F:SCAL YEAR E.'iOl:'iG DATE. JU:'iE J(l 
CITYV..~OE D:SCR£'10SARY. l':scAL YEAR E:'iOISG DATE. APRIL J(l 
•• C:-n'\\mE o:SCR..."110SAilY F:G:JRF.S: !>!AY 19'50. FEBRUARY 19'17. 
. . 
·'. . 
98 26.70% I 


















GENDER & ETHNIC 
CLASSIFICATION 






















H I R I N G P A T T E R N S 
CITY\llDE 
1984-85 1985·86 1986·87 
1,508 1,574 1,285 
9.53X 10.59X 10.55X 
3,076 3,306 2,893 
19.44X 22.24X 23.75X 
806 723 749 
5.09X 4.86X 6.15X 
116 120 100 
0.73X 0.81X 0.82X 
12 7 8 
0.08X 0.05X 0.07X 
F I S C A l Y E A R S* 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 7 PAGE 1 
CITY\llDE DISCRETIONARY TALENT BANK 
1983·84 1984-85 1985·86 1986·87** 1983·84 1984-85 1985-86 1986·87 
1,013 1,692 1,505 1,292 38 45 51 46 
18. 75X 17.38X 16.06X 16.68X 10.35X 9.51X 12.56X 9.41X 
' I 
I 
1, 157 2,083 2,244 2,010 44 50 54 86 
21.41X 21.40X 23.95X 25.95X 11.99X 10.57X 13.JOX 17.59X 
265 53.0 510 532 13 33 33 29 
4.90X 5.45X 5.44X 6.87X 3.54X 6.98X 8.13X 5.93X 
53 107 98 87 1 1 6 3 
0.98X 1.10X 1.05X 1.12X 0.27X 0.21X 1.48X 0.61X 
i 
0 0 0 2 2 0 D 
o.oox o.ciox o.oox 0.03X 0.54X o.oox o.oox 0.20X 
-------·--------------·------------ ----------------------------------------;---------------------------------------------·---------------
TOTAL FEHALE 4,046 
34.40X 




* CITY\llDE, TALENT BANK - FISCAL YEAR ENDING DATE, JUNE 30. 














35 .4 rr. 















H I R I N G P A T T E R N S f I S C A L Y E A R S* 1 9 8 3 • 1 9 8 7 PAGE 2 
CITYUIDE CITYUIDE DISCRETIONARY TALENT BANK .. 
GEHDER & ETHNIC .. 
CLASSi~ICATION 1983·84 1984·85 1985·86 1986-87 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87** 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 
-- -
MALE·UHITE 4, 744 5,954 5, 176 4,045 1, 758 3,015 2,775 1, 921 184 190 147 109 
40.34X 37.6JX 34.82X 33.21X 32.53Y. 30.98X 29.62Y. 24.80X 50.14X 40.17X 36.21X 22.29X 
MALE·BLACK 1, 911 2,758 2,532 1,904 759 1,528 1,495 1,246 48 89 n 130 
16.25X 17.43X 17.03X 15.63X 14.05Y. 15.70X 15.96X 16.09X 13.08X 18.82X 17.73X 26.58X 
MALE·HISPANIC 836 1,325 1, 120 956 314 591 513 478 32 59 39 70 
7 .11X 8.37X 7.53X 7.85X 5.81X 6.07X 5.47'.( 6.17'.( 8.72X 12.47X 9.61X 14.31X 
MALE·ASWI 211 262 300 234 85 187 230 175 5 4 4 12 
1. 79X 1.66X 2.02X 1.92X 1.57'.( 1.92X 2.45X 2.26X 1.36X 0.85X o.m 2.45X 
MALE·AM. IND. 13 7 9 6 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 3 
o,,.11x 0.04X 0.06X 0.05X o.oor. o.oor. o.oor. 0.03X o.oox 0.42X o.oox 0.61X 
·-·-----------·--···------------------·---------------------------------------------------------------------------·----------------------
TOTAL MALE 7,715 10,306 9, 137 7, 145 2,916 5,321 5,013 3,822 269 344 262 324 
65.60X 65. 13X 61.46X 58.66X 53.96X 54.67X 53.50X 49.35X 73.30X 72.73X 64.53X 66.26X 
• CITYUIDE, TALENT BANK • FISCAL YEAR ENDING DATE, JUNE 30. ** NINE MONTH PERIOD, HAY - FEBRUARY. 











H I R I N G P A T T E R N S F I S C A L Y E A R S* 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 7 
CITYUIOE CITYUIOE DISCRETIONARY TALENT BANK 
GEUDER & ETHNIC 
CLASSIFICATION 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87** 1983-84 1984-85 • 1985-86 
-
TOTAL HALE 7,715 10,306 9, 137 7, 145 2,916 5,321 5,013 3,822 269 344 262 
65.60X 65.13X 61 .46X 58.66X 53.96X 54.6n: 53.50X 49.35X 73.30X 72. 73X 64.53X 
TOTAL FEHALE 4,046 5,518 5,730 5,035 2,488 4,412 4,357 3,923 98 129 144 
34.40X 34.87X 38.54X 41.34X 46.04X 45.33X 46.50X 50.65X 26.70X 27.27X 35.47X 
TOTAL MINORITY 5,796 8,362 8, 117 6,850 2,633 5,026 5,090 4,532 145 238 . 208 
49.28X 52.84X 54.60X 56.24X 48.72X 51.64X 54.32X 58.52X 39.51X 50.32X 51.23X 
TOTAL HIRES 11, 761 15,824 14,867 12, 180 5,404 9,733 9,370 7,745 367 473 406 
100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 
CITYUIDE CITYUIDE DISCRETIONARY TALENT BANK 
TOTAL HALE c4 · 34,303 
1983 - 1987 62.79X 
TOTAL FEHAL~ 20,329 
1983 - 1987 37.21X 
TOTAL MINORITY 29 I 125 
1983 - 1987 53.311. 
TOTAL HIRES 54,632 
1983 - 1987 100.00X 
• CITYUIDE, TALENT BANK· FISCAL YEAR ENDING DATE, JUNE 30. 






























DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LABORERS 
Calendar Year 
1984 
Sex and Ethnicitv Breakdown 
Total DEP Laborer Hires = 78 Source - DEP 
Personnel Records 






























€ 8 . 5 7 ~"'-----7 1 4 ~ !1:-
2. 86%-- • - 0 
11.43~> 
~ ..,, ~ ..., 0 C:./~ 
...J • ' ..... ' ;) '- v • - ' ~ 
11.43% 
100% 













.... , <j> ........ .. . 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LABORERS 
Calendar Year 
1985 
Sex and Ethnicitv Breakdown 
Tctal DEF Laborer Hires = 119 Source - DEP 
Personnel Records 




































""' f"\., o .. L. • ::J ~ .. 0 
19.42%/33.98% 
. . 97% 
.97% 
100 % 














·-.. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Total Hires (1984 and 1985) for 
Assistant Highway Repairer, Debris 














Total Hires (1984 and 1985) for 
Assistant Highway Repairer, Deckhand 









































Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown 
DOT Deckhand Hires from Talent Bank = 7 
White Males 




































Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown 
DOT Deckhand Hires from Talent Bank = 26 
White Males 23 
Black Males 2 
Hispanic Males 1 
26 
Total DOT Deckhand Hires = 27 
White Males 24 
Black Males 2 








































Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown 

























































Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown 
DOT Ferry Agent Hires from Talent Bank = 9 
White Males 
Black Males 





































DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Assistant Highway Repairer 
Calendar Year 
1985 
Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown 
DOT Assistant Highway Repairer 































































Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown 
DOT Debris Remover Hires from Talent Bank =·20 
White Males 7 
Black Males 10 
Black Females 1 
Hispanic Males 1 
Hispanic Females 1 
20 





























































Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown 
DOT Debris Remover Hires from Talent Bank = 15 
White Males 
Black Males 
























































. ~ ~ASTNAME FIRST AREA AGNCYNM HIREDATE SALARY TITLE CC•ri1fJlE ---------- -------- ---------- ---------- -----
Rotler't vl 1 r1 DOT 06/25/84 20211 ASST. HIREL. 
HWY. REP. ,;. 
-WARNING- No rows satisfy the WHERE clause 
~ ~ ·r ... ()p-~~ 






Arg ier1tC• Johr1 drnrc DOT 05/18/84 20211 ASST. HIRED 
HWY. REP. -!.-·.·- . 
. Deutcher1 Ge•:•rge dmrc DOT 05/18/84 21Zl2 l 1 ASST. HI REC 
!-!WY. R.---, 
\LO Di G i arm i 
i::.l- • 
~iit·=· dmrc DOT 1215/15/84 14781 DEBRIS HI REC 
,, REiY!O'v'E ~ 
Schiulaz Christoohe drnrc DOT llZl/15/84 -0- SERV. HIRE[ 
! r INSP. L1:1Be 11 r:' J1:ihr1 drnrc BUILDil\iGS 10/08/84 l E. ili!Zi tZl URBAN HjRE~ TEC:-1. , act i. 
b~·~\._ IJ~ ~ /)er-> 2(&< lASO~t!l~v~ a~ 
a1 r1. 
DiCarlucci J•:•hn dmrc DOT tZl5/15/.'34 14781 DEBRIS HIRED 
·=· 
~EiY!OVE~ 
Macchia Joseph drnrc DEi=• 12/01/84 -QI- LABORER HIRED 
LAS TN AME first area reosal titll titl2 titl3 TITL4 er1dt .. 
---------- ---------- ------------
----- ----- ----- ----- --------
Lo:iBe 11 •:• JO:•i1i'1 dmrc $15, IZllZllZI. 01Zl 11Z1132 11Z1112 8tZI 112 22100 il18/01/84 
Michael C!mrc $12, 371. tZltZI E.tZl61 7 5E.IZl56 61Z!41Zl7 -0- 08/14/84 ' 
0 (}. ~ -WARNING- No rows satisfy the WrlERE clause 
LP.S7NAME first area reasal titll titl2 t1tl3 TITL4 enct 





#b f'/lc; rL~y ~ · 3 
s/7 / Jfr 1;:1 
: : iEil· 1L: 'i'Nl~I last narne FI HST HI REDATE TITLE SALARY area E S 






r · ... . ·, 





L (·· · •. -. · •. ' E~ c ·c l •=• ·r-1 
i .. .. :,,::. 
:~ J i::.i I 
i"• t:i : 
j i l~ J I 
1. l · i 
I .ll .J I 
i •lJ I 
I.i i .l 1 r,1 / f."i 
1-·· t ii .~ ~. C:.:::: 
... : ;1 -
• . • . ..I 
Ca 1 a bro:• · 
Col ·:•r1 
b.:1 l l i na 
JC.\SWi Cl<. 
,Paq l i nco 
Pf2i"'ry 








1 '• 1 -~:,·,··t i i"1i::!Z 
i:.• 1 !~ E! 1 :L l 
~:· • .tll"L:.1 
n ·, .. ...-, ~, l; 1-i:::in n 
1:{ 1 vt::- ·1·a 
Li:;. l '1. 











\,/ 1 Y1CC7.l"1t 
,Ji::1st-:? 


























LfiHU t~t.: f< C 
L.. . noo1:~EH 
Uff<lJF<ER C 
Collepe Aide 
05/15/85 Motor Vehicle 
Uo<=r. 
11/01/84 DEGRiS REMOVER 
iz14/(::·:.;/05 bC:t~11. 
:t l\ibF·ECTDI~ 
09/01/84 ATTENDANT . 
t!:\•~/ 23/ 84 t ·E 1h~ 'f ~1GENT 
1Z1fl/ti.:11 I iV1 Utff<f'..ll ·J TECH. 
1Z1L1/2'3/f:l5 ;::•(-1i-1 I l 
ll/01/h4 DEGRiS REMOVER 
08/01/84 puto Mechanic 
·-· V.1-·- -121 ... 





gldn C l"l 
26518 glcm H M 
25518 gldi'I C i°'I 
•7.:E~':i1H g ldn C M 
L::: G 5 1 8 g 1 d i'1 C f't1 
•7.:~-11 6':1 [J 1 [; \ri i) l'tJ 
..... . 
2G518 g l dn l.~ r'i 
•7.:E.:7H 8 f~ 1 c n C 1~1 
c~E.518 glcln Ee frl 
p 1 air1 B !YI 
11 t.;1{)1L1 ~J l Ci i "I C I~: 
l 5tZl1Z11Z1 P. l d ., .. , H 1~·1 
1~j158 g l cJn C 111 
131Z11Z11Z1 g lo n H M 
17ti22 ~:1 l ct;·, .1""1 l'i 
IZI [} 1 Cf ·lrl 
261L.l1ZllLI r:) 1 Cff1 
1 ~)1/11Z11£1 g 1 c , .. , 
l 3 "1A r; l Cl'1"1 
g l c,·,··, 












c:2 T utK4- l_ 
5· ~1~( 
5 B/ I-/ 






































JOSEPH In VINCENZO 
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE MAYOR. 
THE CITY OF' NEW YORK 
0,.,.ICE 01'" THE MAYOR 










. . . 
, .. ;' \ ;, . ASSISTANT HIGHWAY 
Christopher Schuilaz 
-Bronx, NY 10465 
( 212) . ( 212) 
~ Russell Lockwood Staten Island, NY ( 718) 10301 
1) William Hnatio 
Bklyn, NY 11209 
(718) I 
lf) Joseph Curry 
Staten Island, NY 10308 
( 718) j) Ernest Moerlins 
Staten Island, NY 10304 
(718) : 
b Giovanni Buono 
Staten lsland, NY 10303 
( 718) 
l Ric~ard Kilichowski 
Staten Island, NY 10306 
(718) 
J Isidor Suarez 
Bkiyn, NY 
(718) 
~ ~alph Slaton \~ v~ 
Hollis, NY 11423 
( 718) 
IL) ~ohn Prociw 
Astoria, NY 
( 718) 








'.... .f · -
' . I 
. ;~ 
.·. ,_. \ 
,J .• 
., 
ASSISTANT HIGHWAY REPAIRER 
(]) Hak Kyu Song 
Queens, NY 11402 
(718) ~ . 
Arnold Mitchem 
Bronx, NY 10452 
Christopher Mustaciuhlo 
Staten Island, NY 
( 718) 
Anthony Joseph Ruiz 
NY, NY 
(212) 
Frank Ressa, Jr. 





Br6nx, NY 10468 
Joseph D. Carbone 
Woodhaven, NY 11421 
(718) 
ATTACHMENT 
J 
